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UN-INCORPORATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN THE





Judicial self-restraint which defers too much to the sovereign powers of the states
and reserves judicial intervention for only the most revolting cases will not serve to
enhance Madison's priceless gift of "the great rights of mankind secured under this
Constitution."
- Justice William J. Brennan, 19611
Although there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the
State consideration of such issues, no binding weight is to be attached to the State
determination .... The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair
consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived
a federal constitutional right.
- Justice Felix Frankfurter, 19532
This Article addresses the relationship between § 2254 of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is a substantial body of literature that either laments or celebrates
the rigid limitations on relief imposed on state prisoners attempting to
vindicate their federal constitutional rights in federal court. In a series of
cases beginning with Williams v. Taylor, the Court has left little doubt that
Assistant Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. Many thanks to Jon
Sands and Rebecca Aviel for their early inspiration and tireless talk-throughs. I am also
indebted to Fredric Bloom, Sam Kamin, Doug Keller, and Even Tsen Lee for their valuable
substantive comments on earlier drafts.
1 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 778
(1961).
2 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
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patently incorrect interpretations of the United States Constitution do not
necessarily warrant relief under the applicable provision of the habeas
corpus statute, § 2254. The question remains, however, whether such
limitations on the ability of federal courts to enforce the Federal
Constitution represents a constitutional problem.
This Article is the first attempt by a commentator to reconcile § 2254
with the Fourteenth Amendment, ultimately concluding that § 2254, as
currently applied, is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's
incorporation doctrine. The hallmark of incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, or more precisely, selective incorporation, is the
promise that constitutional rights must apply with the same force and
breadth in each of the fifty states, a promise that is impossible to realize
under the strictures of § 2254. Because § 2254 impedes the ability of
federal courts to apply the Federal Constitution to constitutional claims-
e.g., the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-there appear to be serious
Fourteenth Amendment concerns that have previously gone unexplored.
Because of the limitations on relief for incorrect applications of the
Constitution imposed by § 2254, and in view of the nature of certain of the
rights announced in the Bill of Rights, this Article posits that the
constitutional criminal procedure rights have been sub silentio un-
incorporated.
The selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the
Fourteenth Amendment is the hallmark of modem criminal procedure and
represents a tuming point in our nation's collective understanding of
federalism. 3 By incorporating the Bill of Rights-both as to non-criminal
3 In discussing the significance of the incorporation doctrine, Justice Brennan noted:
After his retirement, Chief Justice Earl Warren was asked what he regarded to be the decision
during his tenure that would have the greatest consequence for all Americans. His choice was
Baker v. Carr, because he believed that if each of us has an equal vote, we are equally armed
with the indispensable means to make our views felt. I feel at least as good a case can be made
that the series of decisions binding the states to almost all of the restraints of the Bill of Rights
will be even more significant in preserving and furthering the ideals we have fashioned for our
society.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 492-93 (1977). Brennan stressed that in order to be meaningful, the
rights and remedies available under the Bill of Rights had to apply with equal force to both
the federal and state governments. Id. He noted by example that the incorporation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was "virtually
meaningless" so long as "the states were left free to decide for themselves whether any
effective means of enforcing the guarantee was to be made available," and suggested that
meaningful incorporation required that the exclusionary rule apply to state proceedings. Id.
at 493.
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rights such as free speech,4 and as to criminal rights such as the right to
counsel 5-the Supreme Court sent a clear message to the states: the
protections afforded to individuals under the Bill of Rights applied with
equal force to state and federal governments.6 Concerning the protection of
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, incorporation and the Supremacy
Clause required that "the states were to receive no greater deference for
their judgments than the federal government., 7 This was consistent with
the view of Alexander Hamilton that, particularly in the case of federal
rights that are locally unpopular, the "local spirit may be found to disqualify
the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national cases."
8
Recently, however, the Supreme Court's understanding of the
relationship between state and federal courts regarding questions of federal
constitutional law has strayed from the first principles of incorporation.
The Court's federalism jurisprudence is so fractured as to defy a coherent
narrative. The Supremacy Clause continues to be given the utmost force in
the context of federal preemption,9 but the Supreme Court's unwillingness
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment renders the First Amendment's
prohibition on the abridgment of speech equally applicable to the states).
5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that the right includes
the right of the indigent to have counsel provided).
6 See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 317
(1982) ("It may be too extreme to say that the Justices supporting selective incorporation
believed federalism was 'dead,' but certainly they would no longer place federalism on the
plane it once occupied." (footnote omitted)); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 26 (1956) (emphasizing the need for a more
limited approach to federalism when considerations about national rights are at issue).
7 Israel, supra note 6, at 317 (discussing the conclusions of Justice Schaefer, supra note
6).
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 862, 905 (1994) ("Wholly
apart from assertions about the purported superiority of federal judges, common sense
suggests that the meaningfulness of judicial review is greatly enhanced if the reviewing court
owes no special allegiance to the court whose judgment is subject to review." (footnote
omitted)).
9 The Court continues to express broad willingness to deem a provision of state law
preempted by a federal provision. In fact, in just the 2007 term the Court decided three
preemption cases overwhelmingly in favor of the federal government. See Riegel v.
Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (recognizing that the manufacturer of an FDA
approved device may not be subject to a common law cause of action in state court); Rowe
v. New Hampshire, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008) (Breyer, J.) (holding that state law regulating
delivery of tobacco products is preempted by federal law governing sale of tobacco, even
though the state law was specifically intended to protect the health of children); Preston v.
Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding that when parties to a contract agree to
2008] 1233
JUSTIN F. MARCEAU
to insist on a meaningful and uniform application of federal rights, in
particular constitutional criminal procedure rights, calls into question the
vitality of incorporation as a principle of hornbook constitutional law.
1 °
The most anticipated federalism decision of the 2007 term, Danforth v.
Minnesota,11 was illustrative of the confusion that surrounds the future of
constitutional criminal procedure in general, and the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in particular.1 2  In a
surprising twist of alliances, Justices Roberts and Kennedy dissented from
the seven-member majority's refusal to hold that state courts were
constitutionally bound to the rules of retroactivity applicable to federal
habeas corpus decisions; the two Justices dissented on the grounds that the
role of federal courts in ensuring the uniform application of federal law is a
"bedrock" principle of federalism. 13 Notably, both the majority and the
dissent agreed that rules of constitutional law dictate uniformity; the
disagreement arose as to whether the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence
was of constitutional magnitude.1 4  This Article sets out to unpack the
tension between the view shared by all nine Justices in Danforth that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution dictates that federal rights be applied
uniformly and without exception by all state courts; and the Court's
adjudication of the constitutional rights announced in the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.'
5
Stated another way, a half-century has passed since the Bill of Rights
began to be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,' 6 and it is
arbitration of disputes, the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes state laws dictating
jurisdiction in another forum in order to assess the validity of an arbitration clause).
10 The Court's reluctance to insist on uniformity in the application of the criminal
procedure rights is most easily identified in the context of the Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence. See infra Parts III, IV. But the willingness of the Court to insist on the
uniform application of federal criminal rights is also evident in other contexts. See infra Part
V.
" 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008) (holding that Teague's bar on the retroactive application of
"new" rules of criminal procedure did not apply to state courts (citing Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 308 (1989))).
12 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21,28, 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
"3 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1047 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stressing that the Court's
failure to impose rigid constitutional uniformity is "startling").
14 Id.
"5 Id. at 1053, 1053 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stressing that the Supremacy Clause
"was meant to prevent" any "disuniformity" as to constitutional interpretation).
16 It is difficult to identify the first decision recognizing incorporation, at least as the
doctrine is presently understood and applied. The origins of the modem incorporation
doctrine are often traced to an opinion by Justice Brennan, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (Brennan, J., separate opinion). For a fuller discussion of the
history and evolution of incorporation, see Israel, supra note 6.
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useful to consider whether the fundamental rights announced in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution continue to enjoy as much force,
effect, and supremacy when applied against the states as they do when
applied to the federal government.17 Recent legislation and federal cases
suggest that, at least with respect to the constitutional rights of criminal
procedure, there is a movement afoot that defies the black letter conception
of incorporation and instead favors deference to local interpretations of the
Bill of Rights. That is to say, an argument can be made that the criminal
procedure rights are being, if not radically un-incorporated, gradually
rendered less effectual.
This Article examines the Court's willingness to tolerate, indeed
endorse, localized applications of the constitutional amendments regarding
the rights of criminal defendants, and contrasts this with the Court's
continued adherence to the principle that it is the Court's "role under the
Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its meaning and its
reach,. . . to ensure the uniformity of that federal law."' 8 Because the Court
continues to describe glowingly the supremacy of federal pronouncements
in the field of criminal procedure, the question necessarily arises whether
the Court's Fourteenth Amendment (incorporation) and Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence are compatible with the limitations imposed on criminal
defendants attempting to vindicate their federal rights.' 9 Recognizing that
federal habeas corpus proceedings may be the best, and in some instances
the only, vehicle available for ensuring state court adherence to the
Constitution, this Article devotes significant attention to the correlation
between the availability of federal habeas corpus relief and the ability of a
defendant to vindicate his constitutional rights.a
17 In 1969, Professor William W. Van Alstyne published A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison. 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. This piece could just as aptly be called A Critical Guide to
Selective Incorporation. The purpose of Professor Van Alstyne's article was to revisit and
assess the doctrine announced in Marbury because, in his view, all other rules of
constitutional law "inevitably turn[] back to this early case." Id. at 2-3. In the same vein, the
present Article endeavors to critically reflect on the history and evolution of the doctrine of
incorporation because every question of federal criminal procedure "inevitably" turns on
how the Fourteenth Amendment applies.
"8 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1032 (stressing
that state courts may not threaten federal uniformity as to federal rights by providing lesser
or different interpretations of the federal constitutional protections).
19 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (recognizing limitations on the
justiciability of Fourth Amendment claims). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000 & Supp.
V 2005) (imposing limitations on relief for prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief).
20 Of particular relevance to this Article, commentators have observed that when writ-of-
error review as of right was available in federal court, the role of federal habeas review was
less significant as a check on the application of federal law by state criminal courts;
however, because writ-of-error review in federal court is now discretionary, federal habeas
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As a matter of history, many fundamental criminal procedure rights
were discovered and announced on federal habeas corpus review. As a
practical matter, the fact that writ-of-error review as of right no longer
exists dictates that the Supreme Court, through its discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction, will rarely exercise jurisdiction over state criminal convictions.
Accordingly, by curtailing substantive federal review of claims asserting
federal constitutional rights in the habeas context, the federal rights
themselves are, for all intents and purposes, no longer under the
guardianship of the federal system, and instead are largely left to the
discretion of state courts.21 That is to say, legislation and case law, working
in tandem, have begun to substantially undermine the principle that was at
the core of the incorporation doctrine-that states were to receive no greater
deference than the federal government in adjudicating the Constitution.
22
review has become the only available "substitute mechanism for post-conviction review of
federal questions." Steiker, supra note 8, at 910; see also James S. Liebman, Apocalypse
Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1997, 2071 n.440 (1992) ("The Court justified its preference for writ of error review
on the ground that the writ of error was available as of right." (emphasis omitted)); Justin F.
Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA 's § 2254(d)(2) & (e)(1), 82 TUL.
L. REv. 385, 389 (2008) (stressing that "[o]n a theoretical level, even today, few would
directly dispute the important role the writ of habeas corpus plays insofar as it is, effectively,
the only mechanism through which a state prisoner can challenge the constitutional propriety
of his trial in federal court.").
21 Stated another way, the writ of habeas corpus has become "essential to federal
supremacy." Steiker, supra note 8, at 886. But see Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27
(2002) ("The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts for
these judgments [as to the application of federal law], and authorizes federal-court
intervention only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. It is not that here.
Whether or not we would reach the same conclusion as the California Supreme Court, 'we
think at the very least that the state court's contrary assessment was not "unreasonable".'
(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701 (2002))). That is to say, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a
federal court is not entitled to intervene and, for example, prevent a death sentence from
being carried out, even though the federal court concludes in its independent judgment that
the state-court decision applied the Constitution incorrectly. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25.
Unconstitutional executions are, in other words, an anticipated consequence of the current
habeas corpus systems.
22 Schaefer, supra note 6, at 26 ("Considerations of federalism of course remain
important. But in the world today they must be measured against the competing demands
arising out of the relation of the United States to the rest of the world .... [T]he criminal
procedure sanctioned by any of our states is the procedure sanctioned by the United
States."). To be sure, other court and legislative doctrines impose limitations on the ability
of individuals seeking to vindicate constitutional rights-a statute of limitations or a bar on
successive habeas petitions-but this Article attempts to explain the distinction between
these ministerial limitations and the dramatic substantive limitations imposed by recent
criminal procedure reforms. Reforms like AEDPA work to trigger substantive constitutional
disuniformity that is different in kind and scope than that tolerated under the routinely, and
uniformly, applied ministerial doctrines like statutes of limitations, and it is this sort of
substantive disuniformity that is in tension with incorporation.
[Vol. 981236
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Nonetheless, after exploring the tension between recent criminal procedure
reforms and the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, this Article suggests that it is an open question as to whether the un-
incorporation (or shrinking) of federal criminal procedure rights will help
more than it hurts criminal defendants.23
I. INTRODUCTION
When people proclaim that they know their "rights," they are often
referring in some general way to the Bill of Rights.24 As Professor Akhil
Amar has observed, persons asked about their rights or privileges as U.S.
citizens will almost invariably "invoke rights that are explicitly declared in
the Bill of Rights .... The rights to speech, religion, a fair trial, and to
be free of cruel and unusual punishment, to name but a few, are viewed as
synonymous with citizenship.26 However, at least for the first century and a
half of our constitution's history, the rights announced in the Bill of Rights
were illusory as applied against the states. Until the middle of the twentieth
century, an individual could not complain that his rights under the first ten
Amendments were being violated by a state or local government; the Bill of
27Rights applied only to regulate the behavior of the federal government.
In Barron v. Baltimore, Chief Justice John Marshall considered the
question of whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well as the
28federal government. In Chief Justice Marshall's view, the question was
"of great importance, but not of much difficulty. 29 In ruling that the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation did not apply to state or local governments,
Marshall reasoned that "[t]he [C]onstitution was ordained and established
by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own
government, and not for the government of the individual states."
30
Explaining further, Marshall added:
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the
powers of the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original
constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had [C]ongress engaged in the
extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states by
23 See infra Part VI.
24 See Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights
Against States?, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 444 (1996).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
28 id.
29 Id. at 247.
30 Id.
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affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own
governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared
this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
3 1
To be sure, Marshall's interpretation of the Bill of Rights was not an
unprincipled limitation on the rights of individuals.32 The enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, provided the Court with a new lens
through which to view this question of "great importance." By the mid-
1960s, the Court had abandoned the framework set forth in Barron and
ruled, instead, that (most of) the Bill of Rights was incorporated so as to
apply against the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.33 That is to say, the Court adopted a position akin
to the now mainstream view that the Bill of Rights applied against the
states, 34 and over time held that the Fourteenth Amendment "impose[s]
upon the states all of the [criminal] procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights except for the grand jury indictment and civil jury trial
requirements.
35
Any suggestion that the Court will hold that the incorporated Bill of
Rights no longer applies to the states is unfounded, even foolish.3 6
Nonetheless, there exists a growing body of court opinions that sanctions
legislative calls for deference to the adjudications by state courts of federal
rights. The Court's evolving conception of federalism is, to be sure,
31 Id. at 250. Apparently, Marshall anticipated that the Framers would have used a
phrase such as "[n]o State shall" if they intended for the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights
to apply against the states. See Amar, supra note 24, at 444; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1198 (1992) ("One can
quibble around the edges, but the core of Marshall's argument is compelling." (footnote
omitted)).
32 Amar, supra note 31, at 1198.
33 See infra Part II(A).
34 Amar, supra note 24, at 444. Some commentators have suggested that the fact of
overwhelming public support may, without more, lend legitimacy to the constitutional
interpretations of the Supreme Court. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH:
HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence generally should mirror public opinion).
35 Israel, supra note 6, at 272; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Reflections on Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 483, 487 (2007) (noting that incorporation was achieved
through a process of "gradual linear extrapolation," rather than "an act of one-time
boundary-crossing exportation").
36 Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110, 136-
37 (1999) (citing Supreme Court cases and noting that the Court now takes for granted the
idea that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates certain aspects of
the Bill of Rights).
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confused, 37  but the waning practical force of the Warren Court's
incorporation decisions is beyond question.38  Even if the phrase un-
incorporation is a touch hyperbolic, the premise certainly merits
consideration.
Accordingly, it is worth beginning a dialogue about the status of
selective incorporation as a doctrine of constitutional law by examining the
sort of illustrative examples of judicial abdication that characterize modem
federal review of state interpretations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments. 39  This Article explores the question of whether judicial
deference to state judgments in the context of habeas corpus signals what
has come to look like the beginning of a criminal procedure counter-
revolution, 40 and provides examples of statutes and precedents that are
illustrative of the growing acceptance of deference to state court judgments
on questions of federal constitutional criminal procedure law. Although
there are many limitations on the availability of remedies for constitutional
harms, as with all questions of law, reasonable lines must be drawn. This
Article argues that the disuniformity generated by the certain criminal
procedure reforms is sufficiently substantive as to be impermissible as a
matter of Fourteenth Amendment and Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.
37 Compare Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1053 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (decrying the majority opinion for inviting "disuniformity in federal law" and
insisting that the Supremacy Clause prohibits the Constitution from being "applied
differently in every one of the several States"), with Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933,
1939 (2007) (holding that a prisoner is not entitled to a constitutional remedy merely because
the state court misapplied federal constitutional law and, instead, insisting that something
"substantially higher" than state court error as to federal law was required in order to justify
relief).
38 See infra Parts III, IV (analyzing the modem Court's hostility to the centerpiece of the
Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147-48 (1997) (noting that the Warren Court
doctrine has been "busily reshaped" such that all of the Warren Court landmarks are
"distinguished away" and "hollowed out from within").
39 The term abdication is appropriate if one views the protection of federally defined
rights as a non-delegable duty of federal courts. And abdication of the role of primary
interpreter will, in some circumstances, constitute abandonment by the federal judiciary. It
has been acknowledged that some states are "so intractably hostile to federal constitutional
rights and locally unpopular criminal defendants that ... state post-conviction remedies [are]
a foregone fool's errand." Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment, 14 HUM. RTs. 14, 17 (1987).
40 Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT.
REv. 65, 66-67, 77-80 (describing the Warren Court's cases as effecting a revolution of
federal constitutional law); Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice,




First, the most direct and express act of un-incorporation in the habeas
corpus context is a Burger-era opinion, Stone v. Powell .4  Although the
holding in Stone that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the
Fourth Amendment for purposes of collateral review is now accepted as
relatively uncontroversial,42 this opinion marked a radical departure from
the Warren Court's incorporation doctrine.43 If, as Justice Brennan stressed
in his dissent, habeas corpus is the foremost vehicle for raising
constitutional errors," the Court's refusal to disturb a state court judgment
despite a glaring violation of the Fourth Amendment is indicative of the
dwindling force enjoyed by incorporated rights fifty years after selective
incorporation began.
The second and third illustrations focus on a specific provision of
AEDPA.45 Under § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas
corpus unless the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law .... Focusing on the "unreasonable application" and the
"clearly established" law prongs of this requirement, this Article examines
the force of AEDPA in requiring a level of deference that is in fundamental
tension with the spirit and rationale of incorporation. To illustrate the
conflict between AEDPA and incorporation, I will focus on one example
arising under the Fifth Amendment 47 and one example arising under the
Sixth Amendment.48
The fourth example, though illustrative of the broader trends in this
area of law, is specific to a particular Eighth Amendment claim. The
analysis focuses on the Court's holding in Atkins v. Virginia that executing
4' 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
42 There are numerous reported decisions demonstrating that federal circuit courts
unflinchingly apply the rule announced in Stone. For example, in Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d
1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of habeas relief
because the grant of relief was premised on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Ninth
Circuit did not disagree with the district court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was
violated, and it acknowledged that the prosecution had even "neglected to assert that the
claim was barred by the rule of Stone v. Powell." Id. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit, over a
scathing dissent from Judge Reinhardt, held that Stone reflects a "categorical limitation on
the scope of the exclusionary rule" that cannot be waived by the State. Id.
43 Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-95.
44 See, e.g., id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is simply inconceivable that [a]
constitutional deprivation suddenly vanishes after the appellate process has been
exhausted.").
41 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, 28, 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
41 See infra Part III.B.
48 See infra Part IV.
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the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.49  Of
particular relevance is the fact that federal courts have, at the urging of the
Supreme Court, left to each individual state the task of defining by statute
what constitutes mental retardation.5 ° In other words, Atkins provides an
example of a situation in which the Court recognizes that the Eighth
Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
substantive right to defendants, and that the scope of that right may be
defined by the state. In essence, the Eighth Amendment protections apply
to each state, but each state is allowed to define the substance of the right in
a slightly different manner.
Finally, the Article concludes by analyzing whether this new era of
incorporation, which prioritizes a formalistic rather than substantive
adherence to the doctrine of selective incorporation, is more or less
beneficial to persons charged with crimes than was the previous regime.
This Article draws on scholarship suggesting that the robust procedural
rights afforded to defendants by the Court have worked proportionately
greater substantive and procedural harms on defendants over the long term.
The question is whether recent reforms, though antithetical to constitutional
incorporation, might trigger bold and progressive experimentation by the
states. 51
I. INCORPORATION GENERALLY: THE RATIONALE AND THE FUNCTION
A. DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
In order to assess the impact of recent actions by Congress and the
Court on the doctrine of incorporation, it is necessary first to set forth with
clarity the purpose and history of incorporation. The analysis of whether
the current scope and application of the constitutionalized criminal
procedure rights are in tension with the concept of incorporation must begin
with a precise working definition for incorporation.52
49 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) ("[T]he mentally retarded should be categorically excluded
from execution.").
50 Id. at 317 (leaving to the states "the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction" on executing the mentally retarded (quoting Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 405, 416-17 (1986))).
51 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 3, at 503 ("[T]he very premise of the cases that
foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach.").
52 More precisely, the question is whether the Court's willingness to countenance
disuniformity presents a Supremacy Clause issue. If the Constitution mandates a particular
limitation on state action, there is little doubt that state practices inconsistent with this
limitation run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly,
federal legislation or judicial opinions that are in tension with the Fourteenth Amendment, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, are unconstitutional.
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Properly understood, constitutional incorporation is a vehicle by which
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution are nationalized. It is a
doctrine grounded in pragmatic concerns about the importance of ensuring
reasonable parity 'between constitutional rights and the availability of a
remedy, and premised on the idea that the uniform application of the Bill of
Rights must be given priority over local control and self-government. 53 As
Professor Israel has explained, selective incorporation was justified on the
theory that these rights were of such national and fundamental concern as to
"outweigh[] considerations of judicial self-restraint and deference to the
values of local control. 54
Accordingly, one of the most useful ways of defining the doctrine is to
explain what it is not: the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the
Fourteenth Amendment is not consistent with an expansive view of
federalism that permits local experimentation and discretion on the part of
state governments and courts.55 This is not, however, to suggest that no
affirmative definition of incorporation is available. For present purposes,
incorporation can adequately be explained as the process by which selected
rights are applied consistently and with equal force to the federal
government and each of the states. Under this definition, "once a provision
of the Bill of Rights has been held applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it... appl[ies] to the States in full strength., 56 There cannot
53 Israel, supra note 6, at 316.
54 Id. Deference to local control of national rights that are locally unpopular has always
been regarded as inconsistent with the practical realization of those rights. See, e.g.,
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 793, 802-03 (1965) (synthesizing sources reflecting the notion that
"provincialism" and "local spirit" have been recognized as material impediments to the
recognition of unpopular national rights in state courts, and recognizing this as one of the
defining rationales for federal diversity jurisdiction).
55 This is not to suggest that the proponents of incorporation had disregarded the notion
of federalism in order to justify applying the Bill of Rights to the states. The proponents of
incorporation viewed this symmetrical limitation on the authority of governments, both local
and national, as a safeguard on fundamental liberties, not an unwarranted usurpation of
governing authority by the federal government. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). As Justice Goldberg noted, "[T]o deny to the States
the power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to increase federal power, but,
rather, to limit the power of both federal and state governments in favor of safeguarding the
fundamental rights and liberties of the individual." Id.; see also Israel, supra note 6, at 317
(citing Schaefer, supra note 6, at 26) (noting that it would be "too extreme to say" that
incorporation had completely killed federalism, but stressing that it was no longer on the
same "plane it once occupied").
56 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 413 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the idea of allowing
states to serve as "laboratories" of local experimentation has no place in the context of
fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
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be, in other words, a federal right and then various subjective applications
(or "watered-down" versions) of this right across the states.
57
In large part, the recognition that an incorporated right must be applied
with some base line of uniformity (a federal floor) is a product of the
relationship between the Supremacy Clause and all provisions of the
Constitution. The doctrine of selective incoqroration announced by the
Warren Court,58 and embraced by all subsequent Courts, provides that most
provisions contained in the Bill of Rights apply to the states, and the
Supremacy Clause dictates that all constitutional rights apply, as much as is
practically possible, without variation between the states. 59 The concept of
incorporation, therefore, cannot countenance deference to states as to the
substance and content of the incorporated right.60  Thus while the rights
afforded to a defendant may vary as a matter of state law, a defendant's
rights under the Federal Constitution should not vary according to the local
whims and subjective political climate of a particular state.61
57 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); see also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 413
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (expressly rejecting Justice Harlan's call for a "watered-down"
application of the Bill of Rights).
58 Israel, supra note 6, at 253 (tracing the history of selective incorporation as the
foundation for the "Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution").
59 Under the doctrine of incorporation, "When it came to balancing society's need for
protection from crime against the interests of suspected and accused persons, the states were
to receive no greater deference for their judgments than the federal government." Id. at 317.
60 Stated another way, the basic premise of the incorporation doctrine is that "when a
procedural guarantee is applied to the states, it is applied with the same force as when it is
applied to the federal Government." Id. at 325 (citation omitted); see also Brennan, supra
note 1, at 778.
61 The importance of uniformity in the interpretation of federal constitutional rights is
also illustrated by a distinct line of cases regarding the role of federal courts when a state
court decision rests on a confusing blend of state and federal law. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983). In Long, the Court stressed that it is "incumbent upon this
Court... to ascertain for itself.., whether the asserted non-federal ground independently
and adequately supports the judgment." Id. (quoting Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S.
765, 773 (1931)). More relevant, the Court went on to hold that when there is no
independent state law ground for a decision, state courts are precluded from advancing a
more robust reading of the individual rights at issue. Id. at 1042 n.8 (rejecting Justice
Stevens's view that the Court should not review a state court decision as to a federal right
unless the decision "endangered" a federal right). Like incorporation, the rationale
underlying the Michigan v. Long independent and adequate doctrine is uniformity. "[S]tate
courts are required to apply federal constitutional standards," and they may not interpret
these standards in a way that is more generous or more restrictive than the interpretation
provided by the federal courts. Id. Of course, it should be noted that as a practical matter,
Justice Stevens's observation is likely correct-"the 'need for uniformity in federal law' is
truly an ungovernable engine." Id. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the incorporationist
mantra of uniformity is not inconsistent with the view espoused by Justice Stevens. All that
incorporation requires is a uniform federal floor below which state action cannot go; the
doctrine concedes, even invites, variation and disuniformity above this line.
2008] 1243
JUSTIN F. MAR CEA U
Although this Article ultimately acknowledges that the Warren Court's
approach to constitutional rights was not infallible and recognizes that
moving away from incorporation might be good for the rights of
defendants, it also posits that the time has come for the Court to clarify its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. If the Constitution mandates a
uniform application of federal rights, the tension with criminal procedure
reforms like AEDPA must be squarely addressed by the Court. As it
stands, the intellectual integrity of the "umpiring" 62 that Chief Justice John
Roberts has recently announced as a first principle of adjudication is
nowhere to be found in the Court's federalism jurisprudence regarding the
scope and effect of federal constitutional rights. Within a several month
period, Chief Justice Roberts has joined opinions that excoriate federal
circuit courts for requiring state courts to apply federal law in manner
consistent with federal interpretation, 63 and he has simultaneously written
an opinion stressing that it is nothing short of "startling" for the Court to
consider allowing variation or "disparate" interpretations of the "same
Federal Constitution[al]" questions. 64 If the constitutional rights of criminal
procedure no longer apply with full and uniform force against the state
governments, the doctrine should be declared defunct.65
62 "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire." Confirmation Hearing on
the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts,
Jr.), available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=JGRHearing.ask&dn
=Swearing%201no20%2d%200pening%2ORemarks%2c%2OJudge%2ORoberts.
63 Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743 (2008); Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933,
1939 (2007).
64 Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1053 n.2 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
65 Because incorporation is a principle of constitutional law, and not merely a court-
created procedural rule, the rejection of incorporation must be initiated by the Supreme
Court, not by Congress. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as 'the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation,' declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison ... that 'It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' This
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."
(citation omitted)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."); see also Dickerson v. U.S.,
530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000) (recognizing the material distinction between legislative and
constitutional rules).
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B. TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF INCORPORATION
Only by tracing the birth and evolution of constitutional incorporation
is it possible to assess the veracity of one of this Article's central assertions:
that incorporation is diametrically opposed to the sort of local control and
deference to state courts that characterizes modem criminal procedure.66
With an understanding of the origins and evolution of the concept of
incorporation in place, it is possible to meaningfully debate whether
specific congressional legislation and Supreme Court decisions have sub
rosa undermined the spirit and purpose of incorporation.67
In Justice Brennan's view, there is no more significant rule of
constitutional law than that of incorporation,68 and given his defining role in
the development of this doctrine, Justice Brennan's definition of
incorporation seems an appropriate place to begin. Brennan defined it as
the rule that:
[T]he citizens of all our states are also and no less citizens of our United States, that
this birthright guarantees our federal constitutional liberties against encroachment by
governmental action at any level of our federal system, and that each of us is entitled
to due process of law and the equa1 _rotection of the laws from our state governments
no less than from our national one.
Of course, understanding how (and which of) the Bill of Rights would
be made applicable to the states via the phrase "due process of law"
requires a dose of constitutional history.
When the Bill of Rights was proposed in 1789, Congress voted on and
rejected an amendment offered by James Madison designed to limit the
66 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (responding to
Justice Harlan's dissent in which he argues that the states must be allowed the freedom to
experiment by stating, "I have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States
should be able to experiment with the protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of
Rights").
67 Professor Akhil Amar has framed the question of whether the Bill of Rights must be
applied with uniformity across the states in the following manner:
Once "incorporated" or "absorbed," does a right or freedom declared in the Bill necessarily
constrain state and federal governments absolutely equally... ? Or, on the other hand, can a
guarantee in the Bill ever lose something in the translation, so that only a part of the guarantee-
perhaps only its "core"--applies against state governments by dint of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Amar, supra note 31, at 1194.
68 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 536 (1986)
(stressing that incorporation was even more significant than cases like Brown v. Board of
Education for the "preservation and furtherance of the ideals we have fashioned for our
society").
69 Id. at 536 (quoting Brennan, supra note 3, at 490).
2008] 1245
JUSTIN F. MARCEA U
powers of the state governments.70 The original Bill of Rights simply did
not "vest[] citizens with rights against states.",71 Not surprisingly, then,
Chief Justice Marshall held that the Bill of Rights only applied as a
limitation on the power of the federal government and did not serve any
limiting function on the individual states.7a But the events leading up to the
Civil War exposed, once and for all, the fundamental disconnect that may
occur when a constitutional democracy founded on notions of certain
inalienable rights trusts the protection of these rights entirely to the local
populations. As Professor Tribe has put it, the view that basic rights were
adequately safeguarded by the states as the "level of government closest to
the people ... [was] impossible to maintain after the great battle over
slavery had been fought.,
73
In direct response to the previous abuses by states, and to a well-
founded fear that the southern states would continue their history of
oppression, in 1868 Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. The
plain language of the amendment ushered in a new era in our nation's
understanding of federalism and in the protections afforded to individuals:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
74
But the scope of the protections provided under the Fourteenth
Amendment would not be fully understood for another century, as the Court
wrestled with various interpretive methods and approaches.
One of the first interpretive steps taken by the Court was to clarify that
individuals did not gain protections enshrined in the Bill of Rights by virtue
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Amendment.75 Although this
position has periodically come under substantial and reasoned criticism, as
of today the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship do not guarantee
protections under the Bill of Rights.76 For the most part, this debate has
70 Id. at 536-37.
71 Amar, supra note 31, at 1260 (summarizing a central point of his previous article,
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991)).
72 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 243 (1833).
73 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-3, at 5 (1978); see also
Brennan, supra note 68, at 537 ("The war exposed a serious flaw in the notion that states
could be trusted to nurture individual rights .... " (citing TRIBE, supra, § 1-3, at 5)).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
76 Amar, supra note 31, at 1197 ("Brennan posed the wrong question: Is a given
provision of the original Bill really a fundamental right? The right question is whether the
provision really guarantees a privilege or immunity of individual citizens[hip] .... ").
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been largely irrelevant from a practical standpoint, insofar as the Court has,
to varying degrees and based on differing rationales, provided for many of
the first eight Amendments to apply against the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Setting aside debates about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
history of incorporation is best understood in terms of the two directly
opposed analytical approaches to incorporation, and the quasi-compromise
position that became the law of the land. Not surprisingly each of the three
approaches was championed by a separate Justice, and each now enjoys a
fairly tidy shorthand reference. The first of the three major theories of
incorporation was urged by Justice Felix Frankfurter and has come to be
known as the "fundamental fairness" approach to incorporation.77 The
second is referred to as "total incorporation" and was suggested by Justice
Hugo Black.78 The prevailing approach, "selective incorporation," which
had aspects of both of the other two understandings of incorporation, was
invented and implemented by Justice William Brennan.79
From the perspective of understanding its practical application, though
not its analytic underpinnings, the most straightforward of the three
approaches was the total incorporation thesis. Under total incorporation,
the Fourteenth Amendment "made applicable against the states each and
every provision of the Bill, lock, stock, and barrel., 80 Total incorporation,
which was famously and repeatedly argued for by Justice Black, actually
may have its origins in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court's
77 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is
worth noting that this "first" approach to incorporation was not, as a matter of history, the
first in time. As Justice Frankfurter himself conceded in a law review article, many early
nineteenth century cases recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment "made applicable" to
the states, for example, the First Amendment. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 746, 747-48 (1965).
78 Compare Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with id., at 71-72
(Black, J., dissenting). The debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter has also been
framed in terms of the relevant, similarly minded scholars: "The classic debate was between
Charles Fairman, a supporter of Justice Frankfurter and his nonincorporation theory, and
William Crosskey, stating the incorporationist views of Justice Black." George C. Thomas
III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and
Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REv. 145, 181 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
79 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
separate opinion); see also Amar, supra note 31, at 1196 ("Justice Brennan tried to steer a
middle course of 'selective incorporation."'). Detractors have described selective
incorporation differently. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has compromised on the ease of the incorporationist position,
without its internal logic.").
80 Amar, supra note 31, at 1196.
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first foray into Fourteenth Amendment interpretation. 8' In his dissent from
the Slaughter-House opinion, Justice Bradley argued that a legislature's
decision to grant a monopoly to a single slaughter-house operator was not a
reasonable regulation insofar as it constituted "an invasion of the right of
others to choose a lawful calling, and an infringement of personal liberty.
82
Commentators have noted that Justice Bradley's expansive vision of the
right to "personal liberty" against the states may have included all of the
Bill of Rights.83 However, Bradley's dissent did not gain traction with the
Court and the notion of total incorporation substantially disappeared from
the Court's consciousness, until Black's "heroic re-examination and
resurrection" of the concept in 1947.84
In his dissent from the Court's opinion in Adamson v. California,
Justice Black provided the most famous presentation of the total
incorporation model.85 In Adamson, Black set forth his simple formula: if a
right is protected under the Bill of Rights, the right applies with equal force
against the policing conduct of the states.86 Scholars have accurately
labeled Black's model as "mechanical. 87  In essence, "Black's approach
simply prejudges the issue [as to whether. a certain provision is
incorporated] by deciding wholesale ... [that] all the Bill's privileges and
immunities" apply to the states.
88
The second analytic framework for understanding the relationship
between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is known as the
fundamental fairness approach. Although this approach found its most
famous defense in the opinions of Justice Frankfurter,89 the fundamental
fairness framework was also accepted by a majority of the Court as the law
81 Israel, supra note 6, at 257.
82 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 120 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
83 Israel, supra note 6, at 257 n.20 (recognizing a suggestion in the dissent that he did
intend for all of the rights to apply against the states).
84 Amar, supra note 31, at 1259. As a historical matter, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S.
323, 360-63 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting), is also understood as evincing a clear preference
for total incorporation. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1494 (2000) ("During the
seventy-four years between Slaughter-House and Adamson, O'Neil thus represents the high-
water mark for the incorporation theory on the Court.").
85 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
86 "To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights
will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written
Constitution." Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
87 Amar, supra note 31, at 1227 (noting objections to "the particular brand of mechanical
incorporation that Black's rhetoric at times appeared to suggest").
88 Id. at 1263.
89 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Frankfurter, supra note 77.
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of the land for nearly a full century after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9"
At bottom, the fundamental fairness analysis is in direct tension with
total incorporation because, as Justice Frankfurter explained, it requires the
Court to recognize that there is no inherent or necessary relationship
between the rights announced in the Bill of Rights and the requirement of
due process provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 Under this view,
the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically extend the specific
provisions of the Constitution that act as limitations on the power of the
federal government; instead, the Fourteenth Amendment is understood to
have an "independent potency," unencumbered by the Bill of Rights.9
Accordingly, in any given case, the Fourteenth Amendment may apply
against the states in a manner that tracks the application of the Bill of
Rights to the federal government, but this will not always be the case.93
According to the fundamental fairness doctrine, the Fourteenth
Amendment "requires only that states honor basic principles of
fundamental fairness and ordered liberty-principles that might.., overlap
wholly or in part with some of the rules of the Bill of Rights. 94 As Justice
Frankfurter articulated the doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
protections "for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they
are basic to our free society."95 Inherent in this conception of incorporation
is the idea that due process and the "ordered liberty" it requires is a rather
general and flexible concept.
96
It is fair to say that the fundamental fairness doctrine, by virtue of its
hostility to rigid rules and rights, focused on generalized notions of fairness
and did not regard strict compliance and consistency of interpretation
among the states and the federal government as an essential aspect of the
relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.97
The constitutional rights were said to apply to the states, but a sort of built-
in margin of error or layer of deference was encompassed within the
90 Israel, supra note 6, at 273.
91 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (responding directly to
Justice Black's total incorporation argument).
92 Id. at 66.
93 Israel, supra note 6, at 273 (noting that in a "particular case [fundamental fairness]
may afford protection that parallels that of a Bill of Rights guarantee").
94 Amar, supra note 31, at 1196 (emphasis added).
95 Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (emphasis added).
96 In Wolf, the Court applied the fundamental fairness test and concluded that, though the
Fourth Amendment was generally incorporated against the states, all of the federal details,
including the exclusionary rule, did not necessarily apply to the states. Id. ("Due process of
law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements.").
97 Id.
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fundamental fairness review. Illustrative of this perspective is Justice
Harlan's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright.98 Justice Harlan agreed with the
Court's holding that indigent defendants had a constitutional right to
counsel; however, in Harlan's view the right to counsel derived from
general liberties embodied in the concept of due process, and not from the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 99 Because the right to counsel, as
envisioned by Justice Harlan, was predicated on the vagaries of due
process, which would vary by situation, Harlan strenuously objected to the
creation of a uniform and nationally applicable right to counsel. 100
Obviously, Justice Harlan's view did not prevail, and today one of the
most sacred rights bestowed upon defendants is the right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.10 1 More importantly, the
majority opinion in Gideon also reflects an important trend away from
fundamental fairness in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. 10 2 As Justice Brennan noted, the Gideon opinion dealt "a
devastating blow to an ad hoc, fundamental fairness approach to the
application of the Federal Bill."'10 3 Indeed, it was the Court's discomfort
with ad hoc and potentially varying interpretations of fundamental rights
that led it to adopt the alternative doctrine proposed by Justice Brennan,
selective incorporation. 1
04
It was the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment only required that the
states comply with the core of certain fundamental rights that ultimately led
to the demise of the fundamental fairness approach. The notion that certain
"watered-down" or varied interpretations of the Bill of Rights were
permitted among the states was decisively rejected by the Court.'0 5 In
detailing his decision to break from the precedent of fundamental fairness
and its tolerance for a reasonable margin of differentiation in the application
of the Bill, Justice Brennan explained that once a right had been
incorporated or nationalized, the Constitution mandated that it apply "to the
98 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
99 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
102 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215
(2003) ("Specifically, Gideon marks the beginning of a shift in the Court's articulation of the
requirements of fair trials away from notions of fundamental fairness in the Due Process
Clause and toward reference to the Bill of Rights via the process of incorporation.").
103 Brennan, supra note 68, at 542.
104 Meares, supra note 102, at 216 (stressing that the end of fundamental fairness meant
an end to a "flexible" approach to applying the Bill of Rights).
105 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263, 275 (1960)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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states with the full federal regalia intact."' 106  There were not, in other
words, any grounds for deferring to a state court's application of a "lesser
version of the same guarantee as applied to the Federal Government."' °7
The Warren Court's break from fundamental fairness was, then, more
than anything else, a product of the Court's complete repudiation of the
notion that federal rights "need not apply with the same breadth or scope in
state courts."'' 0 8  In departing from the fundamental fairness doctrine,
however, the Court did not simply reverse itself and adopt Justice Black's
total incorporation model. Instead, the Court embraced the doctrine of
selective incorporation announced by Justice Brennan.
As a compromise, however, selective incorporation was hardly a true
"middle course" between the two extremes. 10 9  While selective
incorporation is a doctrine with elements of both fundamental fairness and
total incorporation, Justice Brennan's allegiance to the total incorporation
thesis was hardly a secret.'' It has been suggested that selective
incorporation "was simply Brennan's polite way of achieving total
incorporation by indirection, clause by clause, without having to overrule
pre-Warren Court precedent repudiating Black . . . ." Perhaps the
strongest support for this understanding of selective incorporation is that
"Brennan and his brethren never met a right in the Bill they didn't like or
deem fundamental enough to warrant incorporation."
'" 2
But it would be a serious mistake to merely equate Black's total
incorporation model with Brennan's selective incorporation doctrine simply
because Justice Brennan appeared ready to hold that all of the rights
embodied in the Bill of Rights were incorporated. Recognizing the analytic
melding of fundamental fairness and total incorporation that characterizes
Brennan's approach is far more useful. From the doctrine of fundamental
fairness the Court embraced the concept of conducting an individualized
consideration of whether a particular right was incorporated, rather than
106 Brennan, supra note 68, at 544.
107 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1963) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
108 Brennan, supra note 68, at 549; see also Israel, supra note 6, at 291 (noting that the
hallmark of the selective incorporation doctrine is the fact that when a "guarantee is found to
be fundamental, due process 'incorporates' the guarantee and extends to the states the same
standards that apply to the federal government under that guarantee" (footnotes omitted)).
109 Amar, supra note 31, at 1196.
110 Commenting on the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Brennan
called it "unfortunate[] [that] the Court expressly rejected any notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment mandated the wholesale application of any of the first eight amendments."
Brennan, supra note 68, at 538.




simply announcing a wholesale incorporation of the Constitution." 3
Likewise, from the total incorporation doctrine, the Court imported the idea
that, once a right is deemed incorporated, the constitutionality of a state's
criminal procedure practices with regard to that right will be "judged under
precisely the same standards applied [in federal courts]."
'1 14
In short, the Court's final word on incorporation was unequivocal as to
the question of varying or competing constitutional standards. The Court
recognized that an incorporated right, as most all aspects of the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are, must apply consistently and with
equal force in all state and federal courts.' 15  The rejection of the
fundamental fairness approach, which had as its central premise a notion
that the rights might vary or apply in a slightly less onerous form to the
states, left no doubt that the doctrine of selective incorporation provides no
margin for local variation or experimentation that might provide less
protection than promised by the incorporated right.1 16  The question is
whether selective incorporation's requirement that "the states were to
receive no greater deference for their judgments than the federal
government" is compatible with the recent restrictions on habeas corpus
relief. 117
113 Id.
114 Israel, supra note 6, at 293.
115 Justice Roberts has recently spoken on this question with similar definitiveness.
Arguing that rules of retroactivity are of constitutional magnitude, Justice Roberts reminded
the Court that the bedrock of our constitutional democracy is that "'a single sovereign's law
should be applied equally to all,"' such that the Federal Constitution is applied in the same
manner "in every one of the several States." Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1054
(2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism,
35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 4 (1985)). And while the majority disagreed as to whether
retroactivity was a constitutional rule subject to this Supremacy Clause analysis, it too
reiterated the principle that "States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to
make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional
guarantees." Id. at 1032 (majority opinion).
116 As Justice Black once aptly characterized the incorporation position:
I am not bothered by the argument that applying the Bill of Rights to the States, "according to
the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment," interferes
with our concept of federalism in that it may prevent States from trying novel social and
economic experiments. I have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States
should be able to experiment with the protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of
Rights.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
117 Israel, supra note 6, at 317.
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III. THE FIRST TIER OF UN-INCORPORATION: DEFERENCE TO STATE COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WAS AVAILABLE IN FEDERAL COURT THROUGH CERTIORARI ON DIRECT
APPEAL
As a general matter, the Court continues to apply the inflexible
mandates of incorporation. In Wallace v. Jaffree, for example, the Court
held that an Alabama statute authorizing a daily period for prayer during the
school day was an endorsement of religion lacking any clearly secular
purpose, and thus an affront to the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.118 In explaining the decision, the Court rejected what it called
the "District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal Constitution
imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion," and
noted that it is "firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence... that
the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms
protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United
States."' 1 9 The Court's holding, in other words, is premised on the notion
that a provision of the Bill of Rights, once incorporated, restrains the states
to the same extent as the federal government. 20 The question, however, is
whether the Court's fidelity to selective incorporation extends to the realm
of criminal procedure rights, which are most often litigated in collateral or
habeas proceedings.
The distinction between habeas corpus challenges and a direct appeal
of one's conviction (or any other question of constitutional interpretation) is
a distinction of analytic significance.12' Cognizant of the view that limits
on habeas corpus speak only to when the Constitution may be interpreted
and not how it is to be interpreted, the focus here is on those aspects of
"' 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985).
119 Id.
120 The only Justice who finds fault with the broad concept of selective incorporation
adopted by the Court is Justice Thomas, but even Justice Thomas's criticism of selective
incorporation is limited. In Justice Thomas's view, the Establishment Clause "resists
incorporation." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). However, by limiting his rejection of the uniformity-driven theory of
incorporation to the Establishment Clause, Justice Thomas has implicitly signaled his
agreement with the rest of the Court that incorporation remains a valid principle of
constitutional law.
121 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (noting that concerns of comity
and finality are of heightened significance once a conviction is affirmed and the direct appeal




habeas decisions and legislation that effect a material limitation on those
rights that were selectively incorporated against the states. 1
22
To be sure, habeas reforms are, first and foremost, limitations on the
sort of relief that may be obtained through collateral proceedings-after a
conviction has been affirmed through all available avenues of appeal.
123
But the role of habeas corpus as a necessary vehicle for the vindication of
constitutional rights is beyond question, 124 and therefore, the relationship
between habeas reforms and the realization of the principles announced in
the selective incorporation cases is, in many circumstances, quite
tangible.12 5 Moreover, the scope of certain habeas reforms combined with
the nature of some of the rights cognizable only on habeas review leaves
little question that altering the availability of post-conviction relief has
subtly, but substantially, undermined the scope and purpose of the
incorporation-era cases. 126 Stated another way, because a majority of the
Court adheres to the constitutional principle that federal rights must be
"applied equally" in "every one of the several States,"'' 27 unless these
122 For a detailed review of the importance of deciding constitutional questions on the
merits, see Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REv. 1, 49
(2002); see also Sam Kamin, An Article Ill Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil
Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv.
(forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter An Article III Defense] (arguing that merits-first
adjudication in the field of § 1983 litigation is constitutionally permissible and important to
the development of constitutional law).
123 Anthony Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 378, 381 (1964) (considering the appropriateness of collateral relief on the basis of a
Fourth Amendment claim following an otherwise constitutionalfederal trial).
124 Id. at 380 ("[W]ith perhaps greater reason than supports the district courts' federal
question, civil rights, and specified removal jurisdictions-not to speak of the diversity
jurisdiction-it makes good sense to give a state criminal defendant a federal judge to try the
facts underlying his federal constitutional claim." (footnote omitted)); see also Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 424 (1995)
("[F]ederal habeas ... has become.., the most important source of constitutional protection
for state prisoners.").
125 The significance of habeas corpus to the Warren Court is evident from the Court's
habeas trilogy: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). Subsequent cases have curtailed, to varying
degrees, these holdings, but in assessing the relevance of habeas reforms to the realization of
the Court's incorporation jurisprudence, surely it is useful to consider the habeas decisions of
the Court that originally announced the doctrine.
126 Because federal habeas review has assumed a prominent and in some instances
exclusive role as the safeguard on the fair application of constitutional rights, limitations on
habeas are of significant import. Cf Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.").
127 Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1054 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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federal rights are to be viewed as mere hollow abstractions, the Constitution
mandates that appropriate mechanisms (remedies) exist to ensure the
uniform application of these rights, and in many instances federal habeas
review is the only such remedy.
Historically, federal habeas review of state decisions has provided an
important source of redress for the rights protected under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. This Part examines legislative and court-created
limitations on federal habeas review of these rights in order to assess
whether the Court is quietly overruling the doctrine of incorporation. The
reforms affecting the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, at least at first blush,
present a more tenuous ground for treating selective incorporation as a
doctrine in decline, because claims as to these two amendments could, at
least theoretically, be raised on a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court following the prisoner's direct appeal in state court, rather than via
collateral proceedings such as federal habeas corpus proceedings.
128
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ELIMINATING HABEAS RELIEF
1. Incorporating the Fourth Amendment
Professor Donald Dripps has said that "the best way to understand
modem Fourth Amendment law is to characterize it as one long and
awkward reaction against Mapp v. Ohio," the case announcing that the full
protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 129 Understood in this way, perhaps the Court's
disavowal of the Fourth Amendment in the field of habeas litigation should
not be entirely surprising. After all, the exclusion of putatively reliable
evidence has never been a very popular idea. 30  Denying individuals the
opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment violations on federal habeas
review is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the spirit and purpose
128 See infra Part III.A-B. As explained infra, however, the possibility of a grant of
certiorari on direct review does not substantially lessen the importance of habeas corpus as a
federal forum for vindicating federal rights. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8
(1994) (per curiam) (noting that the right to counsel "does not extend to forums for
discretionary review"). Under Austin, an indigent defendant does not have any right to the
assistance of counsel in preparing a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
Accordingly, it is somewhat disingenuous to celebrate a defendant's theoretical right to
petition the Supreme Court as a basis for limiting federal review during habeas proceedings.
129 Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I
Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1615-16 (1996).
130 Akhil Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 644 (1996)
(arguing that the exclusionary rule is an "upside down" remedy because it "creates huge




of the selective incorporation doctrine, a doctrine that to this day has never
been expressly criticized by a majority of the Court.
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
provide a cognizable basis for federal habeas corpus relief.13" ' Specifically,
the Court limited the import of the Fourth Amendment's protections by
providing that "the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."'132 In his
dissent, Justice Brennan, the Justice with the greatest responsibility for the
emergence of the selective incorporation doctrine, 133 expressed disbelief
over the Court's willingness to affirm a conviction that, as a matter of
federal law, was unconstitutional.134 As Brennan noted, Stone v. Powell
foreshadowed the Court's newfound willingness to deprive prisoners of a
"federal forum for vindicating ... federally guaranteed rights," a concept
that he correctly viewed as antithetical to the underpinnings of
incorporation. 135 Indeed, commentators have often noted that prior to Stone
v. Powell, the Court had consistently refused to allow an unconstitutional
conviction to stand. 136 In order to appreciate the tension between selective
incorporation and the Stone decision, it is necessary to consider the
constitutional pedigree of the Fourth Amendment's application to the states.
The seminal case recognizing that the protections afforded under the
Fourth Amendment apply with equal force to the states and the federal
government is Mapp v. Ohio.'37  In Mapp, the Court discussed the
significance of having independent judges who are willing to jealously
guard the rights announced in the Constitution, rather than elected judges
who answer to political constituents. 138 The majority held that by excluding
the use of evidence secured through an illegal search, federal courts are able
to ensure that the Fourth Amendment is not merely "reduced to a 'form of
'1 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) ("[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state
prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.").
132 Id. at 481-82.
133 See Amar, supra note 31, at 1196 (crediting Justice Brennan with developing the
concept of selective incorporation).
134 Stone, 428 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (emphasis omitted).
136 See, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 690-91 (1982).
137 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
138 Id. at 648 (discussing the historical significance of an independent judiciary to
adjudicate unpopular rights).
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words.' ' 139 More significantly, stressing the need for a single uniformly-
enforced federal standard, the Court overruled a prior decision that
recognized that the Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states
but that refused to extend the exclusionary rule to state prisoners through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
140
The holding that the exclusionary rule applies with equal force to the
states was expressly premised on the Court's view that a federal right, once
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, applies with the "same"
force to the states.14 1 Mapp held that to acknowledge a constitutional right
to privacy without providing the "logically and constitutionally necessary"
exclusionary rights, as the Court did in Wolf v. Colorado, would be to
"grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."' 142
Mapp recognizes that the Fourth Amendment, which the Court had already
held to apply to the states, is of no force or effect if divorced from its
accompanying privilege of exclusion. 43 The exclusionary rule, in other
words, is a constitutional rule. 144 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment right
to privacy, or to be free of unreasonable intrusions, is directly and
intimately linked to the availability of a forum in which the right to exclude
illegally-obtained evidence may be challenged.
The holding of Mapp, therefore, is in direct tension with the reasoning
of Stone v. Powell, which notes that "[w]hile courts ... must ever be
concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern
has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence."'' 45 Stone shifts the Court's focus to matters of reliability and
finality and ignores Mapp's concern with the broader prophylactic question
139 Id. at 648 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)).
140 Id. at 653-55 (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
141 Id. at 655. In this regard, the Court's reasoning is of obvious import to the ongoing
debate over rights and remedies. Some scholars argue that a constitutional "right" can never
be limited, but that access to a remedy can, with very few limitations, be curtailed by
Congress. See, e.g., Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative
Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 959 (1998) (arguing that remedial limits on constitutional
rights do "not violate the 'qualitative' requirements of Article 1II").
142 367 U.S. at 656.
143 Id. The Court stressed that once operative against the states, the right "was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent." Id. at 655. In other words, although
complete uniformity is never possible, unreasonable limitations on the remedy constitute a
constitutional violation of the right.
144 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (stressing the distinction
between constitutional rules and rules created by the Court in order to aid in the
administration of constitutional rules).
145 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976).
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of how the privacy rights announced in the Fourth Amendment can be
realized without a remedy.146 Of course, Stone has never been read as a
direct limit on the rule announced in Mapp. On the other hand, Stone arises
in the context of habeas corpus proceedings, and the question is not whether
the exclusionary rule applies at trial or on direct appeal, but rather whether a
violation of the Fourth Amendment that is not discovered until federal
habeas review entitles a prisoner to a new trial. 147 That is, does a violation
of the Fourth Amendment only amount to constitutional injury if it is
recognized and litigated on direct appeal?
Stated more directly, the question posed in this Part is whether the
elimination of habeas relief for patent Fourth Amendment violations is
inconsistent with Mapp v. Ohio and the reasoning that led to the
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment. Though as a general matter,
habeas appeals and direct appeals are substantially different and the two
should not be conflated,148 the practical realities of criminal defense
representation suggest that the limitations on Fourth Amendment relief
dictated by Stone have a direct effect on how the right will be applied across
the states, and not merely when a prisoner is required to raise his Fourth
Amendment claims.
149
146 Id. at 482, 486, 489, 495 (focusing the inquiry exclusively on questions of procedural
fairness).
147 Although Stone is written so as to suggest that its goal of finality is entirely consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the exclusionary rule, as enforceable through direct appeal, the
Court's change in tone and priority is unmistakable. Compare Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647
(warning that the Court's duty as the final arbiter of constitutional rights was to guard
against "stealthy encroachments thereon" (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635
(1886))), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 (focusing on the need for finality).
148 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 447 (1963) (raising questions about the compatibility
of federal habeas and finality and federalism).
149 In an ironic twist to the story of un-incorporation, the concept of selective
incorporation was first announced in a habeas corpus case raising a Fourth Amendment
claim. Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (Brennan, J.). In this case, an
evenly divided (4-4) Court affirmed a conviction (Supreme Court procedures dictate that a
tie vote results in an affirmance of the lower court's decision). However, in announcing
what would come to be known as the concept of selective incorporation, Justice Brennan
rejected the idea that a "watered-down" version of the Fourth Amendment could be applied
to the states. Id. at 275. If the right was incorporated, as the Fourth Amendment had been,
then it was to apply with uniform force to all state court proceedings. Thus, selective
incorporation first appeared in the context of a Fourth Amendment habeas proceeding, and
the process of un-incorporation arguably began with the Court's decision in a habeas case
involving a Fourth Amendment claim.
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2. Un-Incorporating the Fourth Amendment
At first blush, eliminating habeas relief does not appear inconsistent
with the holding that the "exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."1 50  After all, the prisoner has the
opportunity the raise this claim on direct appeal in state court, and more
importantly for purposes of an incorporation argument, in federal court
through a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. If federal review of the
Fourth Amendment claim is available in at least one court, e.g., the
Supreme Court on a grant of certiorari on direct appeal, the proponents of
limiting habeas corpus relief would argue that no legitimate interest is
served by allowing the matter to be re-litigated through federal habeas
proceedings.151 The reality, however, is that federal habeas has always been
the critical avenue for vindicating constitutional rights.1 52 The difficulty in
obtaining a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court, because of the
limited number of cases reviewed by the Court and the Court's focus on
establishing nationwide precedents rather than correcting constitutional
errors, make the elimination of federal habeas review a material
impediment to the uniform application and development of the Fourth
Amendment.
1 53
50 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
151 This view was summarized by the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 887 (1983) ("[I]t must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for
review of a conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception. When the
process of direct review-which, if a federal question is involved, includes the right to
petition this Court for a writ of certiorari-comes to an end, a presumption of finality and
legality attaches to the conviction and sentence."). In other words, the primacy of certiorari
review in safeguarding constitutional rights renders federal habeas review a non-critical
proceeding. It has been observed, however, that the view that "'the role of federal habeas
proceedings ... is secondary and limited"' and that "certiorari is the primary federal judicial
protection against constitutional violations in state-court [proceedings] . . . is unprecedented
in law and untrue in fact." Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 54 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at
887). As Professor Amsterdam has explained, the certiorari process is simply incapable of
providing a meaningful vehicle for vindicating federal rights because certiorari is not granted
to correct errors in individual cases, not "even the most egregious constitutional errors"; it is
only granted in those cases where the Court's "nationwide precedent-setting function" is
served. Id.; see also id. at 54-56 (providing three examples where the Court has either
explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that it will not permit grants of certiorari to be used as
a vehicle to merely correct errors, even in capital cases).
152 See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008) (recognizing that prior
to Teague, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure were routinely announced on
federal habeas review).
153 Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 54; see also Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the
Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 275 (2006) (stressing that the Supreme Court is not merely
another federal court of appeals in that it does not review cases simply to correct legal errors,
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A defining rationale for the incorporation of certain rights, including
the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches, was a
desire to have a uniform application of rights between the states and federal
government. 154 As commentators have noted, "America [is] too much one
country to justify the deference to local diversity that [would] produce[] a
checkerboard of human rights in the field of criminal procedure.
1 55
Several factors tend to suggest that by limiting when Fourth Amendment
relief is available, the underlying goal of uniformity among the states will
be subverted and the substance of the right diminished. 1
56
First, the impact of eliminating habeas review for a class of
constitutional claims is demonstrated by, among other things, the role that
federal habeas review has played in first announcing a number of new
constitutional rights that are now recognized as fundamental protections
under the Bill of Rights. A number of the Constitution's most cherished
rights in the field of criminal procedure were announced, not on direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, but on federal habeas corpus review. For
example, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court announced for the first time,
in the context of a federal habeas corpus appeal, the right of indigent
defendants to be appointed counsel free of charge. 57  It is difficult to
imagine a right of greater importance in the field of criminal procedure.
58
More importantly, the habeas origins of this right are arguably more than
mere coincidence. 1
59
and noting, instead, that the Court has developed "excessively narrow" grounds for granting
certiorari and reviewing a case).
154 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment calls for the Fourth
Amendment to be applied in the "same" manner against the states and the federal
government); see also id. at 656 (recognizing that the Court has never "hesitated to enforce
as strictly against the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights of free
speech and of a free press").
155 Israel, supra note 6, at 316-17 (quoting FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED
WOUND 39-40 (1970)); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 274 (1973).
156 Justice Brennan commented that Mapp v. Ohio reflected a critical "turning point,"
making it clear that the selectively incorporated rights applied to the same "scope [and]
extent" in state and federal courts so as to effect a "nationalization of the Bill." Brennan,
supra note 68, at 540-41.
117 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
158 Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1389 (2004)
("Unquestionably, Gideon was one of the most monumental criminal procedure cases ever
decided....").
159 Consider some of the statistics regarding habeas corpus relief prior to the advent of
the far-reaching limitations that now characterize the field. By analyzing the availability of
habeas relief prior to the finality driven reforms, one can get a sense of how common it was
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It is widely known that the resources available to lawyers representing
indigent defendants in the federal court system are, in many instances,
vastly superior to what is available to indigent defendants in the state
system. 160  For an indigent defendant, the difference could be an
overworked and underpaid young lawyer appointed by the state for trial and
direct appeal, and, as was the case for Mr. Gideon, the likes of Abe Fortas
representing the indigent defendant on his federal habeas corpus appeal. 1
To be sure, this greatly over-simplifies the range of qualifications of
attorneys available at the state and federal levels, and obviously Gideon
presents a claim under the Sixth Amendment. But the prospect of
discovering or announcing new rules of criminal procedure on habeas
because of the fact that attorneys have lighter case loads and greater
resources is equally likely in the Fourth Amendment context. As one
commentator has noted, habeas allows for a "vigorous federalist balance"
"rein[ing] in recalcitrant states and [giving] federal courts the 'final say."' 162
for a federal court, unencumbered by procedural requirements calling for deference to state
courts, to find that a state court conviction was inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.
Between 1976 and 1983, the federal courts of appeals had decided a total of 41 capital habeas
appeals, and had ruled in favor of the condemned inmate in 30, or 73.2 percent, of them. In the
Fifth Circuit,... considering only cases in which the condemned inmate had been the appellant,
more than 70 percent of such appeals had produced decisions in the inmates' favor.
Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 51 (emphasis omitted). As Professor Amsterdam suggests:
Contemplate for a moment what this means[:) In every one of these cases, the inmate's claims
had been rejected by a state trial court and by the state's highest court, at least once and often a
second time in state post-conviction proceedings; the Supreme Court had usually denied
certiorari at least once and sometimes twice; and a federal district court had then rejected the
inmate's claims of federal constitutional error infecting his conviction and/or death sentence.
Yet in over 70 percent of the cases, a federal court of appeals found merit in one or more of the
inmates' claims.
Id. These statistics alone provide a sobering reminder of the role that habeas corpus has
played in ensuring that state convictions are consistent with the Federal Constitution.
160 See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1095 (2006) (describing the federal defender
system as a "model for the delivery of training"); see also id. at 1127 (calling for federal
funding for state public defender systems so that states can begin providing "competent
criminal representation"). The truth is, state lawyers are simply "paid too little," and the
same is not true of federal defense lawyers. Id. at 1062 (citing Law.com, What Lawyers
Earn 2000, http://www.law.com/special/professionals/nlj/earn/eams_4.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2008)).
161 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335 ("Abe Fortas, Washington, D.C., for petitioner").
162 Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 537 (2008).
From this perspective, it is not as though federal courts are regarded as the idyllic forum for
constitutional issues. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977)
(arguing that federal courts provide a more competent and reliable forum for adjudicating
federal constitutional questions). The interest protected by federal habeas is not some
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After Stone v. Powell, however, the resources of the federal system are
irrelevant to the quest to ensure that states are correctly and uniformly
applying the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Directly related to the relationship between adequate resources and the
vindication of the selectively incorporated rights is the question of whether
a direct appeal review of one's constitutional claims by the U.S. Supreme
Court is a practically viable option. Certainly opponents of federal habeas
corpus who view federal habeas as mere duplicative litigation would agree
that the absence of any opportunity for review of state court interpretations
of constitutional rights by the Court on direct review would constitute a
direct assault on the doctrine of incorporation.163 After all, without the
availability of review by any federal court on direct review, there would be
no avenue for a defendant to ever vindicate his Fourth Amendment rights in
federal court. 164 The high court would no longer be the "ultimate arbiter of
the rights of its citizens." 165 The question, then, is to what extent certiorari
review provides a meaningful opportunity for constitutional redress so as
not to render the right a mere abstraction.
Notably, the availability of certiorari on direct review is extremely
limited. Both as an empirical reality based on the Court's docket and the
rules governing grants of certiorari, and as a practical matter in terms of the
resources needed to file a petition for certiorari with the Court, in most
cases state prisoners are deprived of any opportunity to have the state
court's interpretation of their constitutional rights reviewed by a federal
court. The Court's own structures and procedural rules tend to foster the
very sort of under-litigation on direct review that makes habeas review so
critical to a uniform application of the incorporated rights of criminal
procedure. 1
66
guarantee of grand, consistent, and independent constitutional truths, but rather, it is the
promise of a (possible) check on otherwise recalcitrant states.
163 The most famous critique of the modem approach to federal habeas review was
written by Professor Bator. Bator, supra note 148 (arguing that when there has already been
a "full and fair" review of a federal claim, principles of collateral estoppel suggest that
federal habeas review is superfluous).
164 Moreover, there would be no forum in which defendants could have their other-non-
Fourth Amendment claims-reviewed in federal court other than habeas review.
165 Welton 0. Seal, Jr., "No Equal Justice ": The Court Reins in the Right to Appointed
Appellate Counsel in Austin v. United States, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2408, 2427 (1995) (quoting
Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1973)).
166 It is a well-settled principle of Supreme Court practice that the "denial of a writ of
certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of [a] case." United States v.
Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). This is because the Court's decision to grant certiorari is
not predicated on whether a case was correctly decided as a matter of federal constitutional
law, but whether a Supreme Court decision on the issue could create useful nationwide
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The Court's certiorari jurisdiction is extremely limited and, for the
most part, bars the Court from granting certiorari merely to correct the
interpretational or legal errors of a state court. 16 7  But for an indigent
defendant, the Court's rules may not be the greatest impediment to gaining
federal review. As Justice Rehnquist acknowledged, the process of
obtaining certiorari review is complicated, highly specialized, and
"arcane."'168 Without effective representation, it is difficult to imagine how
a prisoner with a claim of constitutional error, much less a claim of
nationwide precedential significance, would be able to gain certiorari
review of his claim.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel extends to
appeals.169 Recognizing that, like a trial, an appeal is "governed by intricate
rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding," the Court held
that the right to an appeal would be a "futile gesture" unless it included a
right to effective assistance of counsel. 170 Neither courts nor commentators
have ever called into question the reasoning in support of a right to
effective counsel on appeal. It would, therefore, be odd to view a
defendant's right to petition the Court for certiorari review of his
constitutional claims as anything other than a "meaningless ritual"'17 1 if
defendants are not entitled to counsel, much less the effective assistance of
172counsel, in doing so. Nonetheless, the Court has limited the right to
counsel to the first non-discretionary appeal. There is no right to the
assistance of counsel in seeking certiorari. 173 Accordingly, the right to non-
habeas federal review of a constitutional claim is often theoretical. 174 There
precedent or a looming conflict between circuits. SuP. CT. R. 10, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ctrules/rulesofthecourt.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
167 Amsterdam, supra note 39.
168 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
169 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985).
170 Id. at 396-97.
171 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
172 Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1995) (per curiam); Ross, 417 U.S. at 605.
17' Ross, 417 U.S. at 605 (holding that a defendant has no federal constitutional right to
assistance of counsel for discretionary appeals on direct review); see also Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (reiterating the holding of Ross).
174 The Court's refusal to require the appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals,
standing alone, represents a dramatic break from the framework of selective incorporation
and deserves independent attention. It has been observed that whereas the Court's focus in
the incorporation era cases was with procedural fairness and the protection of the rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the cases that decline to extend the right to counsel to
discretionary appeals are conspicuously framed in terms of "administrative efficiency."
Seal, supra note 165, at 2414-15. But see also Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch,
Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of
Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 247
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are very few defendants that can effectively manage their own state court
discretionary appeals, much less the arcane and complicated practice of
presenting an issue to the U.S. Supreme Court without the right to effective
counsel.
The effect of this inability to induce federal review of one's claims on
direct appeal cannot be overstated. If the Court does not grant certiorari on
any material proportion of the criminal appeals affirmed by state supreme
courts, and if certiorari is not even sought in many cases because there is no
counsel or means for such an appeal, it is difficult to rationalize the view
that habeas corpus appeals are but an extra, even spurious, layer of appeal.
Habeas corpus claims seem to be the only federal route to raise and
vindicate federal rights that are wrongly interpreted by state courts. A
review of published habeas decisions from federal courts-both the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts-underscores this conclusion.175 In a
case before the Supreme Court in the 2006 term, Shriro v. Landrigan, the
Court relied on the convoluted provisions of AEDPA, which apply only to
habeas cases, in order to deny Landrigan an evidentiary hearing as to his
constitutional claims. 176  Noticeably missing from the Court's opinion,
which set forth in painstaking detail the limited role federal courts must
play when a case is on habeas rather than direct appeal, was any mention of
the fact that the Court had refused to grant certiorari when Landrigan had
previously presented many of the same claims he raised on habeas to the
Court on direct appeal.
177
This problem of the unavailability of counsel for the certiorari process
is particularly acute where, as in the context of the Fourth Amendment,
there simply is not any federal habeas review. 178 In describing the impact
of Stone v. Powell, one commentator has aptly noted that "[b]y announcing
numerous exceptions to Mapp's exclusionary rule while simultaneously
cutting off federal habeas corpus review of Mapps's application in state
courts, the Supreme Court effectively has overruled Mapp sub
(2008) (stressing the importance of seeking certiorari from direct criminal appeals or from
state post-conviction proceedings insofar as certiorari review of the claim would be de
novo).
175 See, e.g., Brown v. Omoski, 503 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying constitutional
claims of a capital defendant because the case was before the court on habeas review,
although the claims asserted either were not available on direct appeal or were raised in a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court following direct appeals in the state court).
176 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007).
177 Landrigan v. Arizona, 510 U.S. 927 (1993) (denying the petition for writ of certiorari
following Landrigan's direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court).
178 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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silentio .... ."179  Stated another way, through Stone the Court "has
reinstated the nonbinding framework of [the] Fourth Amendment... that
had previously prevailed under Wolf"' 80  The Court's incorporation
doctrine dictates that all of the procedural details apply equally against state
and federal actors, and this maxim is in direct tension with the
jurisprudence of fundamental fairness, which, through decisions like Wolf,
expressly approved the stratification of higher order (more complete)
federal rights that applied against the federal and state governments, and
lower order federal rights that applied only against the federal
government. 181 Furthermore, to give incorporation substantive content, if a
federal right exists, there must be a practical means of vindicating it; that is,
"[i]f a provision of the Bill of Rights is sufficiently rooted in our traditions
and constitutional text to command application against the states via the
Due Process Clause, there is little basis for concluding that it is not
sufficiently important to justify federal enforcement.'
182
The trend away from the gloss of uniformity prescribed in Mapp is
particularly troubling in light of the heightened need for federal guidance in
this realm of constitutional law. In the decades since Stone was published
in 1976, the changing landscape of police technology has made the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures all the
more relevant, but all the more difficult to define.' 83 Thus, federal courts
must be involved in reviewing the interpretations of the Fourth Amendment
provided by state courts if the purpose of selective incorporation in bringing
uniformity to the adjudication of the Bill of Rights is to be realized. Yet,
179 Kenneth Katkin, "Incorporation" of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The View
from the States, 84 NEB. L. REv. 397, 421 (2005).
180 Id. ("Under this framework, state courts are admonished to conform to federal
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, but, for all practical purposes, are no longer
required to adhere to such interpretations."). Most strikingly, Professor Katkin has noted
that "some state courts have openly announced that Mapp is no longer binding on them." Id.
(citing People v. Carter, 655 N.W.2d 236, 239 n.l (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)) (recognizing that
Mapp is no longer the controlling Supreme Court authority).
181 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to
state prosecutions).
182 Steiker, supra note 8, at 920. One could argue that a statute of limitations or other
limitation on the ability of a petitioner to vindicate a constitutional right must also create
unconstitutional disuniformity. However, there is a material distinction between the
substantive disharmony created by rules like Stone that affirmatively bar any federal review,
and a ministerial limitation like a statute of limitations, which is in fact applied uniformly
across the states.
183 "[T]he rapid growth of technology in our contemporary world heightens our need to
understand the Court's definition of what constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Kathryn R. Urbonya, A Fourth Amendment "Search" in the Age of
Technology: Postmodern Perspectives, 72 Miss. L.J. 447, 454-55 (2003).
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the Court has remained deafeningly silent on many of the major Fourth
Amendment controversies of the day.'
184
The dirty secret of limiting habeas review is, therefore, that in most
cases it is the only federal review that a defendant will get. The net result is
that some important Fourth Amendment issues are being decided by state
supreme courts, not the U.S. Supreme Court, and because there is no federal
oversight, the uniformity that once defined incorporation no longer exists.
85
In short, there can be little doubt that Mapp's requirement that the Fourth
Amendment be "enforceable in the same manner and to like effect"
186
across the states is no longer a practical reality.
187
It is one thing for the courts or Congress to announce limitations on the
availability of secondary or tertiary federal review, but it is quite another
thing to limit or eliminate the only realistic opportunity a prisoner has for
federal review of a state court's interpretation and application of a federal
constitutional right. As was the case under the fundamental fairness
doctrine, there is no substantive uniformity, or even attempt at uniformity of
federal constitutional doctrine; once again we have a "checkerboard" of
Fourth Amendment rights. 
188
184 For example, there has been significant litigation involving the Fourth Amendment's
privacy guarantees and how they apply to law enforcement's use of DNA databases. In
Landry v. Attorney General, individuals brought suit in Massachusetts state court
challenging the validity of a DNA database statute that required involuntary collection of
blood sample from all persons convicted of one of thirty-three enumerated offenses. 709
N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999). The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the Fourth
Amendment claim and a petition for certiorari was filed. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Landry v. Reilly, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000), and thus, the issue of how the
Fourth Amendment was to apply in this context was left to the discretion of state courts
without guidance from any federal court.
185 Illustrative of the disuniformity emerging in the Fourth Amendment context is the
question of whether probationers retain any Fourth Amendment protections against searches.
For a discussion of this topic, see Marc R. Lewis, Lost in Probation: Contrasting the
Treatment of Probationary Search Agreements in California and Federal Courts, 51 UCLA
L. REv. 1703 (2004) (noting that while California courts refuse to provide any Fourth
Amendment exclusionary remedy to a probationer, federal courts simply treat a probation
agreement as one factor in the reasonableness test that is part of the Fourth Amendment
inquiry). Presumably, if federal courts sitting in habeas review were permitted to enforce the
Fourth Amendment, this tension would be eliminated, and Fourth Amendment uniformity
would exist.
186 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
187 Katkin, supra note 179, at 421 n. 111 ("Formally, state courts today remain subject to
Mapp. As a practical matter, however, if a state court chooses to disregard the exclusionary
rule in a criminal trial, the only channel available through which an aggrieved defendant may
seek relief is to pursue discretionary certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court.
Such relief is rarely available, even in egregious cases of state court error.").
188 Israel, supra note 6, at 316-17.
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B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: PLACING TIME RESTRICTIONS ON THE
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS
1. Application of Federal Rights
As with the Fourth Amendment, the claim that the Fifth Amendment
has been substantially un-incorporated rests on the assumption that limiting
habeas relief as to Fifth Amendment claims may, in certain circumstances,
diminish the substantive content of the Fifth Amendment rights. Unlike the
Fourth Amendment, however, habeas relief has not been strictly eliminated
for petitioners claiming violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. 8 9 The
Court has held that a prisoner's Fifth Amendment-based rights are
fundamentally related to his basic entitlement to a fair trial; thus, federal
habeas review is justified, although not without significant limitations.' 90
Given the Court's rationale for refusing to extend Stone to the Fifth
Amendment context-citing the role of the Fifth Amendment in "assur[ing]
the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process" 19 1-the
scope of the limitations on habeas relief that have been imposed by
Congress and enforced by the federal courts is rather surprising. Under the
terms of AEDPA, a prisoner's access to habeas relief for otherwise
undisputed violations of the federal rights incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment is drastically curtailed.192  The limitations in
AEDPA are broad, and do not apply only to habeas claims raising issues
under the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 193 Nonetheless, the nature of a "due process" right makes one
aspect of AEDPA's limitations on habeas relief uniquely relevant.
189 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (holding that the restrictions on
federal habeas review announced in Stone v. Powell as to the Fourth Amendment do not
extend to a state prisoner's claim that his conviction is unconstitutional under Miranda); id.
at 686 ("We simply concluded in Stone that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on
collateral review outweighed any potential advantage to be gained by applying it there," but
such was not the case with Fifth Amendment rights like the privilege against self-
incrimination.). Perhaps fearing the backlash from such a broad pronouncement, the Court
has repeatedly declined to extend Stone beyond the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979) (refusing to apply Stone so as to bar a due process claim
of insufficient evidence); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (denying relief, but
taking for granted that due process requires an avenue for habeas claims).
190 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 688.
191 Id. (citations omitted).
192 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000) (applying, for the first time in history, a statute of
limitations on habeas corpus claims); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (imposing substantive
limitations on the availability of relief).
193 In the context of criminal procedure due process adjudications, it is not always clear
whether the court is interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the content of due process as a freestanding right, not as
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Justice Owen Roberts once announced that "[t]he phrase [due process
of law] formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged
in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights."' 194 Stated
another way, "Rules of due process are not subject to mechanical
application in unfamiliar territory."' 95 This means that in interpreting the
scope of due process protections in the realm of criminal procedure, judges
are required to recognize rights and apply procedural protections that are
"neither required at common law nor explicitly commanded by the text of
the Constitution. 1 96 This standard, though open-ended, never proved to be
particularly unworkable.' 97  However, one of the limitations on relief
contained in AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1), narrows the scope of habeas relief to
claims that have been previously recognized and expressly accepted by the
Court, thus building a substantial road-block to the concept of due process
as an evolving and emerging source of protections. 1
98
the right through which others are incorporated, is a matter of significant debate. See, e.g.,
Jerold Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's
Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 306 (2001) (attempting to
define the content of due process as applied to criminal procedure in the post-incorporation
context).
194 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
195 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) ("That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may,
in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial."
(quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 462)).
196 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197 As a matter of history, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the need to develop,
not just interpret, due process. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (recognizing
a due process right to psychiatric assistance when sanity is significantly in question);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (creating a due process right to hearing and
counsel before probation revoked); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (creating a
due process right to introduce certain evidence); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
(creating a due process right to protection from prejudicial publicity and courtroom
disruptions); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing a due process right to
discovery of exculpatory evidence); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (creating a due
process right to trial transcripts on appeal).
198 The discussion of the limitations imposed on habeas relief in the context of the Sixth
Amendment, infra Part VI, focuses on the fact that certain claims under the Sixth
Amendment cannot, as a matter of law, be raised on direct review. That is to say, post-
conviction proceedings and federal habeas are a defendant's first opportunity to raise, for
example, ineffective assistance of counsel. Similar concerns are also relevant for many
generic due process claims involving the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is, for example, impossible for a defendant to fully and fairly
litigate a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence,
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, without the benefit of evidentiary development or hearings, which are
not permitted during the course of direct appeals. Indeed, commentators have begun to
realize that "federal habeas review does not merely provide one forum among many in which
claims of prosecutorial misconduct can be raised effectively .... [T]here are many reasons
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Under § 2254(d)(1), a prisoner is only entitled to relief if the basis for
his plea has previously been held by the Court to constitute an established
constitutional injury-i.e., "clearly established law."1 99 More precisely, the
Court has defined AEDPA's clearly established law limitation as follows:
"the phrase 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this] Court'
refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision., 200  To the extent that due
process is a "living principle.., not confined within a permanent catalogue
of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or essentials of
fundamental rights," the introduction of a statutory provision that defines
due process by reference to a particular point in time would seem
incompatible.2°'
In 2006, the Court decided Carey v. Musladin, the first opinion to
directly address this new AEDPA-imposed concept of due process as frozen
202in time. In Musladin, the Court was tasked with deciding whether the
defendant's due process right to a fair trial was violated when the victim's
family attempted to solicit sympathy from the jury by wearing buttons with
the victim's picture on them to the trial.20 3 Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that the Court had previously held that an
incriminating or prejudicial courtroom spectacle violates the defendant's
why state courts may lack the necessary institutional competence to address the problem
adequately." Ryan P. Alford, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of
Summation Misconduct: Persuasion Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Unbiased
Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REv. 479, 524 (2006) (citing, among other things, the relationships
between local prosecutors and state judges and the political aspirations of state judges as
strong indicia that most states are unable to provide an adequate corrective process for
constitutional injuries). The existence of identified limitations on the ability of some state
courts to provide a forum in which defendants can fairly raise constitutional claims justifies
viewing limitations on federal habeas relief as a direct limitation on the ability of federal
courts to ensure that federal rights are being fully, fairly, and uniformly applied.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006) (limiting relief to claims of "clearly established federal
law").
200 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000).
201 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Notably, the concept of a rather
amorphous definition of due process was exactly what Justice Black railed against in his
opinions advocating total incorporation. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting). However, even under the selective incorporation doctrine, it
remained possible to recognize evolving and expanding due process protections. See supra
note 197 (citing cases recognizing due process as expanding and evolving, although the
incorporated rights remained rigidly tied to the definition applied against the federal
government).
202 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
203 Id. at 72.
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due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.0 4 Justice Thomas,
however, focused on the fact that the prior prejudicial presentations-e.g.,
forcing the prisoner to appear in prison clothes-were "state" rather than
"spectator" imposed harms.20 5 Recognizing "the lack of holdings from this
Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom
conduct," as opposed to that of the state, the Court held that relief was
unavailable because there was not any "clearly established Federal law.,
20 6
The significance of this opinion rests, not so much on the issue of
whether it is consistent with due process for potentially inflammatory
buttons to be worn in court-a question the Court refused to address-but
with the express recognition that habeas relief is not available for otherwise
valid constitutional claims if the Court has not expressly addressed such
claims in a previous holding.20 7 Indeed, Justice Stevens's separate opinion
notes the irony underlying the Court's reliance on dictum in a previous
opinion- Williams-to support the view that only "holdings, as opposed to
the dicta" are relevant to defining the contours of due process. 20 8 In Justice
Stevens's view, the Court was constitutionally required to address the
question on the merits.20 9  Due process adjudications require flexibility,
insofar as the right of due process has been described as the "least frozen
concept of our law,, 210 and Justice Stevens argued that the Court must be
204 Id. at 75-77 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501 (1976)). Both Estelle and Flynn are post-incorporation cases that acknowledge the
evolving quality of due process.
205 Id. at 75-76.
206 Id. at 77.
207 According to one scholarly discussion of Estelle:
A majority of the Court agreed on three criteria for "clearly established" law under § 2254(d)(1).
First, a majority agreed with Justice O'Connor's definition of the phrase as referring "to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions." Second, a majority
agreed that the time limitation [imposed on the evolution of a due process concept] was the date
of the relevant state court decision. Third, a majority agreed that the clause "as determined by
the United States Supreme Court" limited the source of "clearly established Federal law" to
Supreme Court precedent.
Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog: Determining What
Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 747, 766 (2005).
2o. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 78-79 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the irony of relying
on dictum in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000), in order to preclude the use of
dictum in § 2254 review).
209 Id.
210 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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able to acknowledge a new (or existing, but unrecognized) component of
due process.
211
The case history suggests that Mr. Musladin did not seek certiorari in
his case following the conclusion of his direct or post-conviction appeals in
state court. This failure to pursue federal review outside of the habeas
context makes Justice Kennedy's separate opinion factually accurate, if
nonetheless practically difficult to address. Justice Kennedy wrote
separately to express his view that due process may in fact require a "new
rule" in this context; however, Justice Kennedy stressed that there were no
due process grounds for relief in light of the "procedural posture of this
case.'212 In short, the fact that the case was before the Court on habeas
rather than direct review excused the Court from insisting that his right to
due process be further fleshed out and enforced as a matter of federal
law.213  Lower federal courts, state courts, and Mr. Musladin were all
deprived of clarity as to content of the due process right to be tried in a
courtroom free of unduly prejudicial influences because the case arrived
before the Court on habeas review.214 As Professor Alan Chen has noted,
2 Musladin, 549 U.S. at 78-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Reviewing the transcripts from
oral argument in Musladin, Justice Stevens's frustration with the Court's narrow approach to
due process is evident:
JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask this question? Supposing we all thought that this practice in
this particular case deprived the defendant of a fair trial, but we also agreed with you that
AEDPA prevents us from announcing such a judgment.
What if we wrote an opinion saying it is perfectly clear there was a constitutional violation
here, but Congress has taken away our power to reverse it.
Then a year from now, the same case arises. Could we follow-could the district court follow
our dicta or could it-would it be constrained to say we don't know what the Supreme Court
might do?
[Counsel for Petitioner]: It could not follow this Court's dicta... only the holdings, not the
dicta, of this Court establish clearly-clearly establish Supreme Court authority.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17-18, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (No. 05-785).
212 Musladin, 549 U.S. at 80-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213 For a discussion of the importance of merits-based constitutional adjudications, see
Kamin, An Article III Defense, supra note 122.
214 It is probably safe to assume that had Musladin sought certiorari after the completion
of state post-conviction proceedings, it would have been denied. See, e.g., Lawrence v.
Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1084 (2007) (rejecting the view that certiorari review is properly
classified as part of the post-conviction process and noting that Supreme Court review of
state post-conviction proceedings is exceedingly rare). The Court granted certiorari in
Musladin not in spite of, but because, the case was on habeas review. The Court was
interested in defining the contours of the "clearly established" law limitation, not the
contours of constitutional uniformity. Id. at 1089; see also Shay & Lasch, supra note 174, at
240-41 (summarizing empirical findings and noting, "The ascendant star has been federal




this abandonment of merits-based constitutional adjudication has the effect
of stripping constitutional rights of their force and content, because lower
courts, in applying the precedent, tend to treat a non-merits-based
constitutional adjudication as though it were a merits-based adjudication. z15
In essence, AEDPA's limitations simultaneously strip federal courts of the
power to interpret and apply criminal procedure rights uniformly, and
affirmatively establish structural systems that encourage a downward spiral
of constitutional criminal procedure rights.216
An even more recent opinion of the Court, Wright v. Van Patten,
further illuminates the significance of the "clearly established Federal law"
limitation imposed by § 2254(d).2 17 In Van Patten, the Court considered
whether a lawyer representing a man charged with first-degree murder had
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by participating in a plea hearing
by phone.218 In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that "[b]ecause
our cases give no clear answer to the question presented ... relief is
unauthorized. ' '219  Accordingly, rather than interpreting the Sixth
Amendment, providing guidance, and creating uniformity among state and
215 The most notable feature of the Court's increased willingness to review habeas corpus
cases is, as Professor Chen predicted shortly after the enactment of AEDPA, the chilling
effect on lower courts, and state courts in particular, as to the content of federal rights.
Professor Chen has noted that AEDPA:
[M]ay ... lead to greater confusion about the law, or even to subversive transformations of
substantive law ... [because] state courts still look to federal court decisions for guidance on
matters concerning federal questions ... [but] [§] 2254(d)(1) ensures ... that the federal courts'
decisions will provide guidance not about the substantive constitutional law, but about the range
of possible reasonable interpretations and applications of that law.
Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature
of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 535, 628 (1999) (emphasis added). Professor Chen
predicted that:
Some state courts may reasonably misread these decisions as affecting not only federal habeas
review, but also the course of constitutional development. Accordingly, a state court might read
a federal court's decision concluding that another state court had not erred unreasonably as an
endorsement of that state court's actual doctrinal conclusion.
Id. The Musladin decision has been misconstrued as a decision of constitutional law in just
this way by state courts. See, e.g., State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1256 (Wash. 2007) (citing
Musladin and denying a claim based on buttons worn by spectators by noting that "United
States Supreme Court precedent is consistent with our conclusion and confirms that this
issue is appropriate for state court resolution"); id. at 1257 (suggesting that Musladin holds
that state courts are free to interpret the Constitution in varying ways on this question).
216 Cf Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income
Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 485, 512-13 (1987)
(explaining the concept of downward spirals as an analytic model).
217 128 S. Ct. 743 (2008).
211 Id. at 744.
219 Id. at 747.
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federal courts, the Court simply acknowledged that "a lawyer physically
present will tend to perform better," and noted that the posture of the case
required that "the merits of telephone practice ... [be left] for another
day. '220 In short, the fact that the first federal court to review Van Patten's
claim of constitutional injury on the basis of telephonic representation
found constitutional injury was determined to be completely irrelevant, and,
instead, the Court made clear that there is no uniform or defining
interpretation in this field.22'
As with Fourth Amendment cases, because the most significant
limitations on due process review turn on the procedural posture of the case,
it is tempting to blame the defendant for not appealing to the Court after
losing on direct review in state court. After all, habeas review following the
completion of state court litigation does seem inconsistent with the
doctrines of claim preclusion and res judicata. 2  Habeas, then, is a realm
where the vindication, if not the definition, of substantive rights is governed
by process. But the mechanics of the pre-habeas process are too flawed to
justify glossing over the substantive rights at issue.223
There are, in other words, material problems with the assertion that
every indigent defendant has an opportunity to fully present his or her
constitutional claims to the Court on direct review; there are simply too few
resources, too few certiorari grants, and there is too much at stake to view
220 Id. at 746-47. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated, "I emphasize that
today's opinion does not say that the state courts' interpretation of Cronic was correct, or
that we would have accepted that reading if the case had come to us on direct review ......
Id. at 748. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Court announced a modified
formulation of the conventional test for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel. Under
Cronic, the Court recognizes certain narrow circumstances where the prisoner is entitled to
relief under the Sixth Amendment without any showing of prejudice. Id. at 658-60
(permitting lower courts to presume prejudice from, among other things, the "complete
denial of counsel").
22 Again, contrary to the unequivocal purpose of selective incorporation-achieving a
uniformity that would prevent a patchwork of interpretations of the federal Bill of Rights-
the Court is actively rejecting efforts by federal courts to announce and interpret
constitutional criminal procedure rights. See also Kamin, An Article III Defense, supra note
122 (recognizing the risk that constitutional rights will become inadvertently and
permanently fossilized when the Court refuses to address the merits of constitutional claims).
222 Bator, supra note 148, at 447 (urging that a full and fair review of a claim in state
court should eliminate any basis for federal habeas relief).
223 Scholars have observed that AEDPA "does not, on its face, seem to undercut the
power of federal courts to review the substance of state court decisions of federal law."
Bloom, supra note 162, at 539 (emphasis omitted). But this is precisely what makes
AEDPA and other procedural habeas rules so subtly invasive-it is the triumph of process
over substance, wherein the process dictates the scope or availability of the substantive right.
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224habeas as merely an affront to the autonomy of states. It is particularly
telling that the landmark case incorporating the Fifth Amendment and
applying a uniform concept of due process to the states, Malloy v. Hogan,
was presented to the Court, like so many of the critical constitutional
questions of the day, in the habeas corpus context. 225 If one recognizes
Malloy as announcing a constitutional rule under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the Court's willingness to apply congressionally enacted
habeas reforms that undercut the force of this precedent serves to
trenchantly illustrate the damaged status of selective incorporation as a
doctrine of constitutional law.226
Moreover, given the Court's jurisprudential stinginess with regard to
the right to counsel on appeal, the reasoning of cases like Musladin that
defendants must remain incarcerated, or subject to execution, in spite of the
fact that their conviction or sentence is unconstitutional seems dubious.
Specifically, the Court's pronouncement that only the Supreme Court can
announce "clearly established law" for purposes of AEDPA, and the
necessary corollary to this conclusion, that "clearly established law" may
only be discovered on certiorari review, seems an uneasy fit with the
Court's holding that there is no right to counsel for defendants seeking a
writ of certiorari.227 A unanimous Court has recently held that the right to
appointed counsel "does not extend to forums for discretionary review,
228
but discretionary review to the Court is the only vehicle available to
defendants attempting to define the clearly established contours of an
emerging area of law.
224 See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2333
(1993).
225 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (holding that on a habeas review the "same
standard[s]" of due process "apply to state and federal cases"); id. at 10 (stressing that the
Court could not apply a "less stringent standard" when reviewing the state's action than it
would apply as a matter of federal procedure).
226 The cleanest argument that the deference prescribed under AEDPA is unconstitutional
requires one to view substantive federal habeas corpus review as a constitutional right, and
scholars have persuasively argued this very point. Steiker, supra note 8, at 868 ("[T]he
Suspension Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment together are best read to mandate federal
habeas review of the convictions of state prisoners."). Alternatively, some regard AEDPA's
attempt to "qualitatively" limit the jurisdiction of federal courts by dictating new rules for
stare decisis as patently unconstitutional. Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1261-70 (9th Cir.
2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). This Article takes a
different approach: if incorporation of the federal criminal procedure rights is a
constitutional doctrine, and it seems clear that it is, then because federal habeas review is the
only viable mechanism for a prisoner to vindicate his incorporated federal rights in federal
court, AEDPA's curtailment of federal habeas review is in tension with the Constitution.
227 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 605 (1974); see also Austin v. United States, 513 U.S.
5,8 (1994),
228 Austin, 513 U.S. at 8.
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In light of these circumstances and the overriding importance of
habeas as a tool for defining constitutional rules-e.g., the Gideon right to
counsel-the idea that the vindication of one's incorporated rights can be
conditioned on whether the Court has previously adjudicated the same
claim seems irreconcilable with the tenets of selective incorporation. The
"clearly established" law requirement of § 2254(d)(1), as currently applied,
is in tension with Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. THE UN-INCORPORATION OF A RIGHT THAT IS NOT COGNIZABLE UNTIL
POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel plays
a unique role in safeguarding the other rights promised to criminal
defendants by the Constitution. 29  Without competent counsel who
jealously guards the constitutional rights of the defendant, the whole edifice
crumbles, and the criminal procedure rights guaranteed by the Constitution
become a mere 'form of words', valueless and undeserving of
mention .... 230 Similarly, when considering the relationship between
habeas corpus and defining substantive rights, the Sixth Amendment is
uniquely important. For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, unlike the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, a structural or procedural limitation on the
availability of habeas corpus relief directly affects the substantive content of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2 3'
There are two basic considerations that render the review of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on habeas corpus fundamentally
different from the habeas review of nearly any other constitutional right.
First, imagine a defendant whose trial is marred by numerous constitutional
errors. If his appellate counsel is so deficient as to neglect to raise these
errors on direct appeal, relief is not available on these claims. Moreover,
the defendant will not have the opportunity to raise the issue of appellate
counsel's ineffective assistance until post-conviction proceedings. In a
229 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[A]ny person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us an obvious truth.").
230 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 ("The
Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not still be done." (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
231 The content of the Sixth Amendment is uniquely implicated by procedural habeas
reforms because, as explained infra note 233, Sixth Amendment claims are generally not
cognizable on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.
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sense, the right to effective appellate counsel is the gateway to most every
other constitutional claim, but this right cannot be litigated until the
commencement of post-conviction proceedings. Secondly, direct appellate
proceedings are not well suited for raising a claim that trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment.232  Indeed, some
states have expressly held that defendants are prohibited from raising
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.233
As to the first consideration that is unique to the ineffective assistance
of counsel context, the Constitution requires that defendants be afforded
effective assistance of counsel during their first appeal as of right.234 This is
significant because if counsel fails to raise a defendant's valid claims under
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, the defendant will never have an
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate these claims. 35  Therefore, direct
appeals are the sole vehicle through which a defendant can appeal the
constitutionality of his trial without offending any of the federalism and
claim preclusion concerns raised by critics of habeas corpus.
236
The availability of constitutional review in federal court through direct
appeal proceedings, therefore, turns on the effectiveness of direct appellate
counsel. Of course, appellate counsel will, from time to time, provide
232 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (holding that direct appeal proceedings
are not well-suited to the adjudication of ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 124, at 424 (reflecting on the fact that habeas is the only time that a non-
record claim can be adjudicated).
233 State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525 (Ariz. 2002) (holding that ineffective assistance of
counsel claims may only be litigated in post-conviction proceedings and that relief would not
be awarded on direct appeal).
234 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Notably, the problems presented by
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, though of paramount importance to the
realization that habeas relief may be the first and only opportunity for a defendant to
vindicate constitutional rights, is not, strictly speaking, an example of un-incorporation. Id.
(recognizing that the right to effective appellate counsel is derived, not from the Sixth
Amendment, but purely from the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee).
235 As to claims arising under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, a defendant could raise the
claims on habeas, but the claims would be subjected to the deferential review afforded to
habeas claims as discussed throughout this Article. A claim under the Fourth Amendment
that is not raised by counsel, however, is completely waived. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 468,
485 (1976).
236 As noted previously, however, the right to appellate counsel only extends to the first
appeal of right in state court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). The fact that defendants
are not entitled to competent counsel when they seek certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court should not be overlooked by the critics of habeas corpus who view substantial
deference during habeas proceedings as a reasoned response to the fact that the defendant
could have petitioned for certiorari on direct appeal. Cf Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that he might have been inclined to grant relief
in the case were it before the Court in a different "procedural posture"-if it were not a
habeas corpus case).
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constitutionally deficient representation and fail to raise or properly present
certain claims to the state or federal court on direct appeal. Unfortunately,
the structures in place for criminal appeals do not allow for a redo of one's
direct appeal, or a direct appeal of one's direct appeal on the basis of
ineffective counsel. Thus, the first and only mechanism available to a
defendant wishing to realize his right to effective assistance of appellate
counsel is a post-conviction proceeding.237 Accordingly, the adjudication of
a direct appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel through collateral
proceedings does not present any of the typical concerns about preclusion
and federalism argued by Professor Bator and others. Nonetheless, the
same onerous, often insurmountable, limitations on habeas relief apply to
this form of ineffective assistance claim.238
However, the exceptionalism of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as a harm that evades review on direct appeal is also a characteristic
of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 239 The practical and
legal limitations on a defendant's ability to adjudicate claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness make it impossible for a defendant to litigate his
Sixth Amendment right on direct appeal, leaving post-conviction
proceedings as the only possible avenue for relief, and federal habeas
corpus as the only viable federal forum.
The specific practical and legal considerations that rule out the
possibility of fully and fairly litigating an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on direct appeal are well documented, but notably absent from the
usual critiques of habeas corpus arguing that such litigation should be
treated as duplicative, and therefore precluded.240  First, in holding that a
237 Whereas the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel is not an incorporated
right, the Court has recognized the right to effective assistance of trial counsel as an
incorporated right. Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (noting that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is strictly a due process right, although relief determinations are governed by the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
238 Imagine that the trial court made a grievous error and failed to suppress certain key
evidence that was obtained in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel on
his first round of appeals and the right to present the trial court's error to the state's appellate
court. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-57. If the Fourth Amendment claim is properly raised on
appeal, the defendant will receive a new trial. If, however, appellate counsel fails to
adequately present the Fourth Amendment issue in the state court of appeals, the defendant
is completely barred under Stone v. Powell from raising this issue on habeas. The only
possible vehicle for vindicating the constitutional right would be a habeas corpus petition
alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
239 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
240 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 148, at 441; Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970) (suggesting just
four exceptions to requiring a showing of innocence in order to warrant habeas relief).
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prisoner was not barred from raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel
in habeas proceedings even though the same claim had been raised on direct
appeal, the Supreme Court recognized: "The evidence introduced at
trial ... will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting
record in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide either
prong of the Strickland analysis. '2 41  One commentator described the
opinion by saying, "The heart of that decision is that ineffective assistance
claims typically cannot be litigated effectively on direct appeal. 242  In
short, Supreme Court precedent exists for the proposition that defendants
have no practical way to fully and fairly litigate the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel prior to post-conviction proceedings.243 This belies
the framework enforced by the Court and Congress that treats the litigation
of Strickland claims in federal habeas proceedings as a superfluous
infringement on the independence of states, independence that comes at the
expense of a defendant's only viable mechanism for ensuring that state
courts adhere to the dictates of the federally enshrined Sixth Amendment
rights.
244
241 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). Without evidentiary
development beyond the record, the Court noted that it would often be impossible to
establish deficient performance or prejudice. Id.
242 Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 796-97
(2004); id. at 797 ("The only real hope, again says the Court unanimously, is to develop a
specialized factual record on collateral attack.").
243 Id.
244 In addition to seeking certiorari to the Supreme Court on direct appeal, a prisoner may
also petition the Supreme Court for certiorari review following the completion of state post-
conviction proceedings. That is to say, after completing state habeas proceedings, but prior
to commencing federal habeas proceedings, a prisoner may, once again, seek federal review
in the Supreme Court. Thus, there is, at least theoretically, a federal forum for adjudicating
this claim in which the deference mandated by AEDPA does not apply. As a practical
matter, however, there are at least three limitations on this form of federal review that render
it wholly inadequate 'as a cure for the disuniformity in the application of federal rights. First,
some of AEDPA's most onerous limitations would still apply in this forum, in particular the
limitations regarding when a federal right must have been announced. AEDPA precludes
habeas relief unless the claim is premised on "clearly established" Supreme Court law that
existed at the time of the state court adjudication, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000), but
Teague's similar limitations on the application of "new" rules would apply so as to bar the
application of new rules of constitutional law once a prisoner's direct appeal was complete.
Second, practitioners, perhaps out of an awareness of how rare certiorari grants are, or
perhaps as a result of their workload regarding non-discretionary review in other cases,
rarely seek discretionary certiorari review to the U.S. Supreme Court following a state
court's denial of post-conviction relief. It seems beyond question that practitioners must
seek certiorari following a denial of post-conviction relief, if for no other reason than to
preclude the Court from later faulting them for not raising a claim in a "non-habeas" posture;
but the reality is that this discretionary review, much less relief, is virtually impossible to
obtain. Indeed, the third consideration that suggests that certiorari review following state
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In addition to the practical limitations that have led the Supreme Court
to conclude that litigating Strickland on direct appeal is generally frivolous,
some states have actually imposed a legal barrier to the adjudication of
these claims on direct appeal in state court.245 For example, the Arizona
Supreme Court has expressly held that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel must be raised in post-conviction proceedings, and may not be
raised on direct appeal.2 46
In sum, the right to effective assistance of counsel provided by the
Sixth Amendment and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a compelling example of a constitutional right that is
being un-incorporated. A prisoner has no way to seek a meaningful review
in federal court of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, both as to trial
and appellate counsel. The first and only practical opportunity that a
federal court has to ensure that the uniformity of interpretation required by
selective incorporation is carried out is federal habeas review, and habeas
review has been substantially curtailed in recent decades. Selective
incorporation had as its core principle the idea that certain rights would be
nationalized, that is, applied with equal force and consistency across the
states.247 Among other things, the enactment of AEDPA has substantially
undermined this goal.
post-conviction proceedings is not a viable federal forum for vindicating federal rights is the
Court's own view that certiorari is unnecessary at this stage of litigation. In Lawrence v.
Florida, the Court noted that "this Court rarely grants review at this stage of the litigation
even when the application for state collateral relief is supported by arguably meritorious
federal constitutional claims, choosing instead to wait for federal habeas proceedings." 127
S. Ct. 1079, 1084 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court
stressed that there is no need to toll the federal statute of limitations for filing a habeas
petition in the federal district court while a petition for certiorari is pending in the Supreme
Court, even though this means that two federal courts will simultaneously have before them
the same issues, because the likelihood of certiorari is "quite small" and because "more
likely" than not the Court will summarily deny certiorari without a careful review of the
issues. Id. Accordingly, as a practical matter, and on advice from the Supreme Court,
prisoners are required to "wait for federal habeas proceedings" to vindicate incorporated
rights; there is not, in other words, a viable federal forum for review of federal criminal
procedure rights prior to habeas corpus. Id.
245 See, e.g., State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525 (Ariz. 2002).
246 Id. (stating that Strickland claims raised on direct appeal will merely be dismissed
without prejudice to be raised again during post-conviction proceedings).
247 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Israel, supra note 6, at 316-17.
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B. THE INTERACTION OF AEDPA AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA applies to all constitutional claims
raised by a state prisoner litigating a federal habeas corpus petition.248
However, in light of the fact that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be litigated on direct appeal, one of the limitations contained in
§ 2254(d)(1) is uniquely effective in blocking the sort of nationalized
system of rights dictated by selective incorporation.
Among the many reforms to habeas corpus mandated by the enactment
of AEDPA in 1996,249 one provision, § 2254(d)(1), addresses how the
substantive merits of a case should be adjudicated. Under this provision, a
writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless the state court "adjudication
of the claim.., resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law., 250  In
Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court explored the phrase "unreasonable
application," and formulated a definition that sub silentio diminished the
relevance of the selective incorporation doctrine, particularly as to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.251
Of primary relevance for purposes of a discussion about incorporation,
the Williams majority held that "an unreasonable application of federal law
is different from an incorrect. . . application of federal law., 252 A state
court's denial of habeas relief that is premised on an erroneous or incorrect
application of the Sixth Amendment, or any other incorporated right, does
not entitle a prisoner to relief.253 As one commentator has summarized the
provision: "Wrong is not enoug[h]. To issue the writ under § 2254(d)'s
'unreasonable application' clause, a state court decision must be wrong and
unreasonable, i.e., it must be unreasonably wrong. 254
For proponents of a robust writ of habeas corpus, such a limitation
actually undermines the very federalist model it purports to preserve,255 but
this is a familiar debate. The very battle that is now being waged in the
248 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
249 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2261-66 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
250 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
251 529 U.S. 362, 385-86 (2000).
252 Id. at 412 (emphasis omitted).
253 Id.
254 Bloom, supra note 162, at 540; id. at 541 n.274 ("Taylor does not simply invite state
courts to draw unexpected shapes on a clean constitutional slate. It allows them to ignore the
shapes the Court has already drawn, coloring outside preexisting lines.").
255 Id. at 537 (noting that habeas corpus may promote a "vigorous federalist balance");
see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 ("[T]he very essence of a healthy federalism
depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts." (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960))).
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courts between habeas apologists, on the one hand, and those who view
deference to procedurally fair state court adjudications to be of the utmost
importance, on the other, is not only reminiscent of, but eerily repetitive of,
the debates regarding the meaning and scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. In the 1960s, during the heat of the
incorporation debate, proponents of selective incorporation explicitly
rejected the notion that the states could provide prisoners "watered-down
versions of... the Bill of Rights guarantees," 256 and instead insisted that
federal rights be enforced just as "strictly against the States as ... against
the Federal Government .... Opponents of selective incorporation, in
contrast, argued that "compelled uniformity" in the application of federal
rights was "inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system.
258
Similarly, opponents of limiting federal habeas review cite concerns about
the need for a uniform and absolute protection of the Bill of Rights, while
those in favor of limiting habeas relief stress the need for affording state
courts latitude in their adjudication of federal rights.
Obviously the two positions advanced in each debate are
incompatible-i.e., federal courts cannot insist on a uniform application of
federal law by state courts while simultaneously deferring to state court
judgments that are inconsistent with federal law. 259 A certain degree of
disuniformity in the application of federal law will always exist,26 but the
256 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
257 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
258 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
259 The doctrine of fundamental fairness, which was rejected in favor of selective
incorporation, recognized criminal procedure rights that "could overlap in part with the
protections found in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments, but [that were] much
narrower in scope." Israel, supra note 193, at 304. In contrast, by limiting the availability of
habeas relief, particularly for claims like the Sixth Amendment ones that are only cognizable
in the habeas context, the Court has accepted a framework wherein state courts are expressly
permitted to narrow the scope of federal rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d
1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006) (stressing that if it were merely tasked with applying the Fifth
Amendment, the result would be different, but affirming the state court's denial of habeas
relief even though, as the Court concedes, "the state court's interpretation might not be the
most plausible one").
260 For example, federal law is interpreted differently in the various federal circuit courts;
certainly the Fifth Circuit does not consider itself bound by Ninth Circuit case law. But this
lack of uniformity is materially different from § 2254's mandate that federal courts, up to
and including the Supreme Court, must defer to state court decisions that apply federal law
incorrectly. Indeed, the Supreme Court's rules governing certiorari grants and rules
governing en banc review in circuit courts tend to suggest that circuit splits, reflecting
disuniformity as to federal law, provide a compelling justification for additional federal
review. That is, an en banc court or the Supreme Court would consider variation in the
application of federal law as highly relevant in deciding whether to exert an additional,
nationalizing-unifying-level of review. In other words, circuit splits and other such
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spirit and purpose of incorporation as a well-defined principle of
constitutional law is incompatible with the deference prescribed by
§ 2254(d). Nonetheless, the Court currently purports to follow the selective
incorporation doctrine, and yet it applies AEDPA without acknowledging
any contradiction. 26 1 By affirming a state court's incorrect application of
the Sixth Amendment on the grounds that the error was not unreasonably
wrong, the Court's process is not merely affecting when the right at issue
can be raised, but affirmatively enabling alternative state court
interpretations of federal rights.262
The tension between the Court's interpretation of AEDPA and
selective incorporation is illustrated by Woodford v. Visciotti, a habeas case
involving a prisoner's first and only attempt to vindicate in federal court his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.263 The defendant
in this case, John Visciotti, argued that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his capital
trial.264 Mr. Visciotti litigated various evidentiary rulings and questions of
law throughout his direct appeal proceedings, and even filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied.265 There was, then,
disuniformity are merely an unpleasant by-product of a multi-tiered Judiciary, not an
admission that federal law may, or must, vary. The current application of AEDPA
affirmatively condones variation or misapplication of federal law. Complete uniformity may
be an "ungovernable engine," Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1070 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), but that does not mean that it is constitutionally permissible to allow and
facilitate state court deviation from the strictures of federal law.
261 Strictly speaking, one could argue that there is no contradiction in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence insofar as the Court has never actually held that AEDPA is
constitutional. Indeed, circuit court judges continue to entertain the possibility that AEDPA
may be found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1261-70 (9th Cir.
2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that AEDPA
violates separation of powers). As a practical matter, however, there is little question that
the Court views AEDPA as constitutional. The Court has repeatedly refused to address the
squarely presented question of the constitutionality of AEDPA. Compare Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379-89 (2000) (addressing at length the application of § 2254(d)(1)
without addressing the underlying constitutionality of the provision), with Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384) (urging the Court to
grant certiorari on the question of AEDPA's constitutionality), and Williams v. Taylor, 526
U.S. 1050 (1999) (mem.).
262 These variations as to federal rights, however, can only come in the form of less
protection. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038, provides a firm ceiling for federal rights by dictating
that states are not allowed to interpret federal rights more broadly than do federal courts, but
AEDPA expressly permits state courts to err on the side of not recognizing the full scope of
a federal right when interpreting the Bill of Rights.
263 537 U.S. 19 (2003).
264 Id. at 20.
265 See People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1992) (affirming conviction on direct
appeal); Visciotti v. California, 506 U.S. 893 (1992) (denying certiorari).
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absolutely no federal oversight regarding the state's application of the Sixth
Amendment until federal habeas proceedings were commenced.
Accordingly, Visciotti filed a timely petition for habeas corpus in
federal court.266 A federal trial court reviewed the record and concluded
that, as Visciotti alleged, his constitutional right to effective representation
had been violated, and as a result the fairness of his trial undermined. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the district
court's grant of habeas relief as to the sentence.267 In a curt per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals had
failed to acknowledge that under § 2254(d)(1) a state court was not required
to correctly apply federal law.268 The unanimous Court did not disagree
with the district court and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, but, rather, reversed the grant of habeas relief on the grounds
that an "unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law., 269 Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the Ninth Circuit's analytic misstep was its willingness to "substitute[]
its own judgment for that of the state court., 270 That is, the federal court's
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment was held to be of no moment. The
Court held that "under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal
habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision
applied Strickland incorrectly.,
271
266 Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002).
267 Id.
268 Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24-25.
269 Id. at 25 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
270 Id. This rejection of a strict definition of ineffective assistance of counsel to which
state courts must adhere tracks Justice Harlan's opposition to the selective, meaning strict,
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Harlan's view, the federal courts should
"never attempt[] to define with precision" the rights embodied under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 22 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
271 Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 27. In the Sixth Amendment context alone, there is additional
authority from the Supreme Court for the proposition that a state court's refusal to award
relief on the basis of a patent violation of the Constitution is not a basis for federal habeas
relief. In Bell v. Cone, for example, the Court stressed that "it is not enough to convince a
federal habeas court that ... the state-court decision applied [the Sixth Amendment]
incorrectly." 535 U.S. 685, 689-99 (2002). This is striking in light of the Court's continued
assurances that uniformity of right and remedy is mandated as to "federal constitutional
guarantees." Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct 1029, 1041 (2008) (rejecting the notion that
the court-created, or non-constitutional, rule of retroactivity announced in Teague had to be
applied with uniformity by state courts, but insisting that state laws and practices must not
"infringe on federal constitutional guarantees"). There is, in short, a toothless commitment
to the supremacy of the constitutional criminal procedure rights; they are still recited as
though they are beyond abridgment, but there is no practical course for enforcing this
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This overt hostility by a unanimous Supreme Court to the supremacy
of federal courts as the principal architects of federal rights is a striking
repudiation of the spirit and purpose of selective incorporation. If a federal
court is not free to overrule an incorrect state court application of the Bill of
Rights, particularly of a specific right that cannot viably be raised in federal
court prior to habeas review, then it is time to critically reassess the vitality
of the selective incorporation doctrine. When the right to counsel was first
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Douglas expressly rejected the idea that the
version of the Sixth Amendment that applied against the states was a
"watered-down version" of the federal guarantee; if the right applied to the
states, the promise of vindicating that right must be equally robust and
available regardless of whether the claim arose from a state or federal
trial.272 Indeed the very essence of selective incorporation was "compelled
uniformity" 273 as to individual rights such that "the same standards must
determine whether [a constitutional violation exists] in either a federal or
state proceeding., 274 Under AEDPA, however, prisoners like Visciotti are
no longer entitled, at any point during their appeals, to have a federal court
cleanly interpret and apply the Sixth Amendment. Instead, federal review is
always encumbered and watered-down by the deference to state courts
prescribed in § 2254. The access to a remedy has become so encumbered
as to relegate the right to its pre-incorporation status as "a mere form of
words, valueless and undeserving of mention.,
2 7 5
The deviation from the defining principles of incorporation illustrated
by the Visciotti opinion is illustrative, but not at all unique. Describing the
breadth of § 2254(d)(1)'s impact, one commentator has noted that where the
issues of federal law are uncomplicated, the state courts will have little
margin to be "reasonably incorrect" and federal and state law will exist
harmoniously, but where the substantive law is more complicated, § 2254
allows the state courts to view "reaching correct doctrinal answers [as] ... a
strenuous and avoidable chore.,
2 76
promise of constitutionally mandated uniformity, particularly as to a right like ineffective
assistance of counsel that cannot be raised until habeas proceedings are commenced.
272 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
273 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's imposition of
"compelled uniformity" on the states).
274 Id. at 11 ("It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity
of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the
claim was asserted in a state or federal court.").
275 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (internal quotations omitted) (describing the
status of the Fourth Amendment prior to selective incorporation).
276 Bloom, supra note 162, at 542. Although the arguments provided in support of
curtailing federal habeas relief often cite concerns about federalism, the earliest cases
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To the lay person unfamiliar with the nuance and subjectivity that
characterizes constitutional interpretation, AEDPA's limitation on relief
may seem trivial, even semantic. The fact is, however, judicial elaboration
regarding the scope of constitutional rights is a complicated and evolving
undertaking that requires constant tinkering and revision by federal courts.
As Justice Brennan noted almost a decade before the enactment of AEDPA,
"Most [constitutional] cases involve a question of law that is at least
debatable, permitting a rational judge to resolve the case in more than one
way. '' 277 Accordingly, only the most mundane issues of constitutional law
give rise to basic settled principles, and under § 2254 only these issues will
be adjudicated with uniformity in state and federal court.278
Not only is uniformity impossible to impose as a practical matter under
the constraints of AEDPA, but the Supreme Court has gone so far as to
suggest that the details of federal constitutional jurisprudence are largely
irrelevant to state courts. The Court has suggested that a vague sense of
reasonableness is more than sufficient for purposes of constitutional
criminal procedure; complying with AEDPA, the Court held, "does not
require citation of our cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of
our cases." 27 9  Similarly, state court errors as to federal law must be
deferred to by federal courts not only when the court is merely mistaken as
to scope and meaning of federal rights, but also when the state court
"brashly disregard[s] still-valid Supreme Court precedent. 28 °  This is
because AEDPA's "unreasonableness" gloss permits both innocent errors
announcing the selective incorporation gave serious consideration to the complexities posed
by the federal review of state court adjudications. In Mapp v. Ohio, for example, the Court
stated that "the very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless
conflict between state and federal courts." 367 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting Elkins v. U.S., 364
U.S. 206, 221 (1960)).
277 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 333 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278 It has been recognized that very few matters of criminal procedure are "dictated" by
Supreme Court precedent. Instead, particularly with emerging investigative technologies
and the evolving nature of crimes, many cases will present a question that is "at least
debatable" as a matter of federal law. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
AEDPA effectively eliminates meaningful federal review of most federal constitutional
issues. Of course, this is not to suggest that federal courts have a monopoly on the right
answers or the best interpretive methodologies. See Bator, supra note 148, at 446-47.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the consistent and uniform application of the Bill of Rights, as
interpreted by the federal courts, is the hallmark of selective incorporation, it cannot be
doubted that AEDPA and other habeas reforms substantially undermine this goal.
279 Early v. Packer, 537 U.S, 3, 8 (2002); see also Herring v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 397
F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Even a summary unexplicated rejection of a federal
claim qualifies as an adjudication entitled to deference under § 2254(d).").
280 Bloom, supra note 162, at 542; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1080 (2004) (discussing the state court decision in
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).
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and deliberate deviations-"state court[s] [need] not track the swings of
long-running philosophical debates" or track federal interpretations of
nuanced doctrines.281 Just as the proponents of the fundamental fairness
approach to incorporation had advocated due process protection for the core
of the Bill of Rights without all of the "federal regalia, 2 82 AEDPA
alleviates the need for uniformity of interpretation and protects persons
from only those violations of their federal rights that are so unreasonable as
to constitute a fundamentally unfair application of federal law.283
In short, the fundamental purpose of selective incorporation is
irreconcilable with AEDPA's requirement that a "substantially higher
threshold" than incorrectness is required in order for a federal court to grant
habeas corpus relief.28 4  The defining motivation behind the selective
incorporation doctrine was a desire to have the Bill of Rights applied
uniformly across the fifty states so as to avoid "[j]udicial self-restraint
which defers too much to the sovereign powers of the states and reserves
judicial intervention for only the most revolting cases." 285 The distinction
between a "revolting" constitutional error and an "unreasonably wrong"
constitutional error seems elusive. Likewise the limitations on relief
imposed by AEDPA, in practice, are closely related to the now defunct
constitutional doctrine of fundamental fairness. Because the right to
effective assistance of counsel can only be litigated in collateral
281 Bloom, supra note 162, at 542 (noting that this is "precisely what the Supreme Court
permit[s] [state courts] to do").
282 Brennan, supra note 68, at 543-44 (1986) (commenting on his opinion in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1984), by noting that the Court expressly rejected the idea that only "the
core of the Self-Incrimination Clause, that is, the prohibition against use of physically
coerced confessions" applied against the states (emphasis added)).
283 Illustrative of this tolerance for disuniformity in the application of federal rights is the
fact that some federal circuits have held that the limitations on relief contained in AEDPA
apply even to those state court decisions that fail to provide any explanation for the decision.
Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 283, 284 (2004) (examining the question of "how federal habeas courts should review
,silent' state court decisions-that is, summary affirmances or summary denials of relief, or
opinions that dispose of whole claims in a perfunctory manner (e.g., 'Petitioner's other
claims are without merit.')"). Given that, under Visciotti, incorrect decisions will be upheld
so long as the result is not unreasonably wrong, there are strong incentives for a state court
hostile to criminal appeals to merely deny the state appeals pro forma, knowing full well that
if the question raised is analytically complicated, the Supreme Court will almost certainly
refuse to view the denial as unreasonable for purposes of § 2254(d)(2). In short, state courts
need not even make an effort to understand a particularly complicated area of criminal
procedure; a mere silent denial that is wrong as a matter of law will be affirmed. Id. at 285-
86 (noting that "[t]he Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that silent
judgments" warrant deference under § 2254(d)(l)'s unreasonableness provision).
284 Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007).
285 Brennan, supra note 1, at 778.
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proceedings, the Court's willingness to strip individuals of a nationalizing
federal interpretation of this federal right is material. No longer are federal
courts the primary and authoritative voice as to the scope and meaning of
constitutional rights in the field of criminal law; instead, state courts are
provided with the discretion to define or vary from the mandates of federal
constitutional law.286
V. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: ALLOWING STATES TO DEFINE THE CORE OF
A FEDERAL RIGHT
Like the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments discussed earlier in this
Article, the Eighth Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment.287 The incorporation of the Eighth Amendment, like that of
the other criminal rights, was intended to impose a sort of rigid uniformity
in the application of the Bill of Rights that had not existed prior to the
Court's decision to adopt the selective incorporation doctrine.288 Unlike the
rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the rights
enshrined in the Eighth Amendment are substantive rather than procedural.
Nonetheless, the Court's recent hostility to rigid national protections is
diluting the protections provided for in the Eighth Amendment.
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was
incorporated against the states. 289 In the parlance of selective incorporation,
this meant that precisely the "same standards" must apply in assessing
whether a state or federal punishment was cruel and unusual.290  A
prohibition made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment applies with no
"less vigor" than the same prohibition under the Eighth Amendment.
291
Either a punishment is cruel and unusual if imposed by any state or the
286 The authority to define federal rights enjoyed by state courts under AEDPA is
particularly troubling in light of the double deference inherent in the AEDPA scheme. As
Professor Chen has pointed out, most post-conviction claims will turn on some form of a
"reasonableness" inquiry, and where federal courts are denying habeas relief based on
particular fact patterns, state courts will inevitably infer the reasonableness of this
conclusion, in spite of the fact that the federal court decision is justified only by reference to
the deference prescribed in § 2254(d). Chen, supra note 215, at 628. In other words,
AEDPA has the tendency to create a downward spiral in the field of criminal procedure
rights insofar as state courts look to the holdings, but perhaps not the reasoning, of federal
decisions in which the court's judicial hands were tied by the constraints of AEDPA-in
effect it is a two-way street of narrowing the scope of criminal procedure rights.
287 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment
applies against the states under the selective incorporation doctrine).
288 Id.
289 id.
290 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
291 Ohio ex reL Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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federal government, and therefore unconstitutional, or the punishment is
constitutional in all states.292
For better or worse, the Court's recent interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment betray the straight-forward, one-size-fits-all system of
categorical rules envisioned by selective incorporation. The nationalized
prohibition on cruel and unusual methods of punishment, of course, remains
in effect, and the Supreme Court continues to define classes of punishment
that so offend notions of decency as to be inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment.293 However, the Court is increasingly willing to delegate to
the states the authority to define and limit the procedural contours of these
substantive rights.294 As with so many things in law, the power to define
the processes and structures available to recognize a right largely dictates
the force and substantive content of the right-as the procedures go, so goes
the substance. The Court's jurisprudence regarding the execution of the
mentally retarded provides one striking example of the court's willingness
to delegate the procedural aspects and, therefore, the substantive content of
a right, to the state courts.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court recognized that mentally retarded
persons are "ineligible for the death penalty. 2 95  To be sure, Atkins's
recognition that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to permit a
mentally retarded individual to be executed constitutes a landmark
development in the field of constitutional law.296 However, the import and
clarity of this right has been clouded by virtue of the fact that the Court has
permitted each state to define, relatively free of federal constraints, mental
292 The absence of a remedy in the Eighth Amendment context would render the right
particularly illusive. If there is no federal vehicle for preventing capital punishments that
are, as a matter of federal law, cruel and unusual, then there is effectively no right.
293 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of a
mentally retarded person is a categorical violation of the Eighth Amendment); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane").
294 See infra text accompanying notes 295-320.
295 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
296 The Atkins decision has had a particularly broad impact on the justice system because
the decision applies retroactively to capital cases that were already final when the opinion
was issued. This result, while rare, was dictated by the Court's previous decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which held that the execution of mentally retarded persons
was not prohibited by the Constitution, but also noted that a prohibition on executing the
mentally retarded was the sort of "new rule" envisioned as an exception under Teague's
retroactivity bar. See Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2002); see also id. at 332
(quoting Penry as to the question of retroactivity: "'[I]f we held, as a substantive matter, that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons ... such a rule
would fall under the first exception to [Teague's] general rule of non-retroactivity and would
be applicable to defendants on collateral review').
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retardation.297 Even now, more than five years after the Atkins decision,
states continue to define mental retardation in vastly disparate manners and
without guidance from the Supreme Court.298  Recently, the Court
implicitly signaled its approval of the disparate definitions of mental
retardation by refusing to grant certiorari in a case that squarely presented
the issue of Texas's uniquely narrow statutory definition of mental
retardation.299
In order to appreciate the dissonance between the hallmark of selective
incorporation, uniformity of interpretation as to rights announced in the
federal Bill of Rights, and the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it
is illustrative to consider some of the variations between states as to the
application of the rule announced in Atkins. The question of the applicable
burden of proof is one area of striking and material differentiation between
the states as a result of the Court's failure to specify the constitutional
procedures necessary for identifying mentally retarded persons. Not
infrequently the battle over the appropriate standard of proof or burden of
persuasion will dictate the outcome of the case. 300 Accordingly, variation
among the states as to the burden of proof will inevitably lead to substantial
disparity between those deemed mentally retarded and, therefore, ineligible
for a sentence of death. Nonetheless, the Court has permitted states to
develop their own unique procedures (including burdens of persuasion) for
adjudicating Atkins claims, and in the process has created substantial
variation in the application of the Eighth Amendment.
The procedures and burdens for proving an Atkins claim could not be
more varied between the states. Although many state courts and legislators
have adopted the preponderance of evidence standard for Atkins claims,
301
a handful of states require the petitioner to prove his or her mental
297 See Atkins, 526 U.S. at 317.
298 See infra notes 300-2 1.
299 Chester v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (denying certiorari).
300 Cf Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976) ("Where the burden of proof lies on a
given issue is, of course, rarely without consequence and frequently may be
dispositive ...."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (recognizing that "the
burden of proof.. . may be decisive of the outcome... ").
30 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(c) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (2000 &
West Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2000 & Supp. 2008); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/114-15(b) (Supp. 2008); Mo. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (West Supp. 2008); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-105.01(4)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098(5)(b)
(LexisNexis 2006); see also N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-2.1(c) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-27A-26.3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(c) (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
15a-104(12)(a) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(c) (2008); WASH. REV, CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.030(2) (West 2002).
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302retardation by clear and convincing evidence, one state requires the
petitioner to prove mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt,3 °3 and at
least one held for a period of time following Atkins that the state was
required to prove that the defendant was not mentally retarded beyond a
reasonable doubt.30 4 There is no question that the Eighth Amendment has
been incorporated so as to limit the actions of all fifty states and create a
uniform standard of national rights, and there is no dispute that it is a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment for a mentally retarded person to be
executed.30 5  However, arbitrariness in the form of political (state)
boundaries, not uniformity, characterizes the question of whether a mentally
impaired individual will be executed.
Imagine that a mentally retarded person was sentenced to death and in
2004, two years after the Atkins decision, sought to have his death sentence
declared unconstitutional under Atkins. If this individual resided in
Georgia, he would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was mentally retarded in order to have his death sentence set
aside.30 6 In contrast, if he lived in New Jersey, he could have avoided
execution unless the prosecution was able to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was not mentally retarded.30 7 Obviously, the Eighth
Amendment would mean something very different for the defendant
depending on whether the individual resided in New Jersey or Georgia.
In addition to the patchwork of burdens of proof, other details
regarding the procedures for assessing mental retardation under the Eighth
Amendment are equally varied. Under Arizona law, for example,
defendants are entitled to a presumption of mental retardation if their IQ is
sixty-five or lower.30 8 Accordingly, once a prisoner in Arizona provides an
IQ test score of sixty-five or less to the state court, then, as was the case
302 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-1102(2) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3)(b) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.137(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008).
303 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (c)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
304 State v. Jimenez, 880 A.2d 468, 484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), rev'd, State v.
Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 191 (N.J. 2006).
305 The Atkins decision makes clear that merely permitting proof of mental retardation for
purposes of mitigation is not constitutionally sufficient. Mental retardation must be viewed
as creating a per se exemption to capital punishment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320
(2002).
306 See GA. CODEANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3).
307 Jimenez, 880 A.2d at 484. Notably, some sense of uniformity was imposed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court when, in 2006, the Court reversed the New Jersey Court of
Appeals and reallocated the burden of proof to the petitioner. Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 191
(adopting the preponderance of evidence standard).
308 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (Supp. 2007).
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under the old New Jersey system, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
prove that he is not mentally retarded. 30 9 This establishes a presumption
against the death penalty when a defendant has an IQ that is well below
average intellectual functioning.31 °
Under Texas law, by contrast, the mechanism for assessing whether a
defendant is mentally retarded is without any categorical rules, and more
importantly, expressly rejects the importance of a national Eighth
Amendment standard.31' Under Texas law, mental retardation
determinations are made entirely on the basis of a series of factors
developed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Briseno.
312
Of the utmost importance to an understanding of the Atkins standard under
Texas law is an assessment of the analytic steps taken by the Texas courts
in defining the Atkins test. In particular, the Texas Court of Appeals noted
that their task was to "define that level and degree of mental retardation at
which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be
exempted from the death penalty. 31 3  In other words, the question was
framed in terms of the Texas political constituency, not in terms of a
uniformly (national) incorporated right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
In stark contrast to the presumption of retardation that exists under
Arizona law, under the Briseno test applied in Texas, the right to Atkins
relief is so narrowly defined as to significantly undermine the protections
announced in Atkins, regardless of a prisoner's IQ.314 Illustrative is the
Briseno test's concern with the facts of the crime. The Briseno court
instructs that in assessing mental retardation a court must consider the crime
for which the defendant was convicted and evaluate whether it required
309 See id.
310 State v. Arellano, 143 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Ariz. 2006) ("[A]n IQ of sixty-five or below
establishes a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation ...."). The remainder of the
Arizona statute tracks closely with the leading mental health literature in the field of mental
retardation and defines mental retardation by reference to two factors: (1) sub-average
intellectual functioning, and (2) significant limitations in adaptive functioning skills. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(K); see also State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. 2003)
("'[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-
care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18."' (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at
320)).
31 Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
314 See id.
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"forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose," factors that
have been expressly discredited by most states across the country.3 5
These divergent standards as to a federal constitutional right are in
tension with the general dictates of federal supremacy and the specific
mandates of constitutional incorporation. There is simply no federal
oversight, much less uniformity. For example, although federal courts have
applied certain minimum scientific requirements to the evaluation of an
Atkins claim in the context of federal death penalty cases, 316 the Supreme
Court has refused to extend this federal standard to the states. Instead,
whereas a defendant sentenced to death in Arizona might enjoy a
presumption of mental retardation based on a low IQ score, the very same
defendant in Texas might be deemed ineligible for Atkins relief on the basis
of a judicial test involving an examination of the facts of the crime. In a
sense, rather than a single and uniform application of the Eighth
Amendment that does not countenance any dilution, the application of the
Atkins standard across the states reflects the very sort of disparity among
states that fueled the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
eventual acceptance by the Court of the selective incorporation doctrine.
31 7
Commentators could reasonably debate the wisdom and equity of the
Court's decision to "'leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce"' the Atkins rule. 3'8 However, the realization of an Eighth
Amendment right through "generalized notions" that vary by state and lack
any sort of compelled uniformity is indisputably inconsistent with the spirit
and purpose of selective incorporation. 3 9 Because selective incorporation
115 Id. at 8-9. Notably, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals has recognized that a focus on
the defendant's criminal activity as a means of establishing that he is not mentally retarded is
inconsistent with the "spirit [and] letter of the law prohibiting the execution of the mentally
retarded." Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). In other words,
neighboring states have mechanisms for defining mental retardation that are in direct tension
with one another.
316 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 419 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894-95 (E.D. La. 2006)
(holding that the AAMR and the DSM-IV-TR definitions reflect a national consensus as to
the proper definition of mental retardation).
317 Amar, supra note 31, at 1242 (tracing the evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment
and stressing that incorporation was born out of palpable fear that the Southern states would
refuse to recognize the rights of freed slaves and others following the Civil War). By 1866,
individuals sought protection from local governments and not merely the federal government
because, as Professor Amar puts it, "[T]he tyranny of slavery could not be blamed on a
distant and dictatorial center, but instead had been perpetrated by local democracies." Id.
318 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 416 (1986), which left insanity determinations to the states). It is worth noting that
Atkins is not the Court's first constitutional rule, the substance of which has been delegated
to the states without any strict guidance. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
319 Brennan, supra note 68, at 542.
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requires federal rights to be applied identically in every state, the Indiana
Supreme Court recently held that Atkins only allows for variation among
the states above a rigid "nationwide minimum" because the "Eighth
Amendment must have the same content in all United States
jurisdictions., 320 Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court has asserted that
uniformity requires deference by the courts to the "definitions [of mental
retardation] accepted by those with expertise in the field.",
321
However, Indiana lacks the authority to impose a uniform
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment on other states. And the U.S.
Supreme Court has recently indicated its unwillingness to announce a
definition of mental retardation that could be applied consistently across the
states.322 In states like Texas where the death penalty is very popular, the
Court's willingness to delegate its authority to expound the precise meaning
of the Eight Amendment is profound. As Alexander Hamilton observed,
state courts are less likely to "give full scope" to federal rights that are
"unpopular locally, 3 23 and as a result, as was the case before selective
incorporation, the Eighth Amendment is characterized by a "checkerboard
of human rights in the field of criminal procedure.
324
320 Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 108 (Ind. 2005).
321 Id.
322 See Chester v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (denying certiorari). It appears that the
Supreme Court has no intention, at least in the foreseeable future, of enforcing uniformity in
the mental retardation context of the Eighth Amendment. Prisoners have regularly
petitioned for certiorari after state or federal denial of their Atkins claim, oftentimes
highlighting the disparate methods of adjudicating mental retardations between the states,
and the Court has not granted certiorari in any of these cases. See, e.g., Van Tran v.
Tennessee, 128 S. Ct. 532 (2007) (denying certiorari); Cherry v. Florida, 128 S. Ct. 490
(2007) (denying certiorari); Chester, 128 S. Ct. 373 (denying certiorari); Grell v. Arizona,
127 S. Ct. 2246 (2007) (denying certiorari); Webster v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 45 (2006)
(denying certiorari). Because the Eighth Amendment only forbids punishments that are both
cruel and unusual, it is possible that the Court will wait a decade or more to allow the states
to experiment, and then eventually determine that those states with Atkins procedures that are
unusual as compared to the practices of other states are violating the Eighth Amendment.
Compare Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (prohibiting the execution of the insane as a matter of Eighth
Amendment law but leaving much discretion to the states), with Panetti v. Quarterman, 127
S. Ct. 2842, 2860 (2007) (expressly declaring Texas's test for insanity unconstitutional under
Ford). But a strong argument can be made that permitting experimentation in the form of
executing those who are mentally retarded under the law or procedures of one state and not
another is itself inconsistent with the basic notions of decency and fairness that underlie the
Eighth Amendment.
323 Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "'Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLuM. L. REV.
157, 158 (1953).
324 Israel, supra note 6, at 316-17 (internal quotations omitted). As Justice Brennan
noted, a constitutional right is "virtually meaningless" so long as "the states [are] left free to
decide for themselves... [the] means of enforcing the guarantee." Brennan, supra note 3, at
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VI. CONFRONTING THE REALITY OF UN-INCORPORATION: ASSESSING THE
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A SYSTEM THAT DOES NOT
UNIFORMLY IMPOSE BILL OF RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE STATES
Because the mantra of uniformity and full force application has given
way to a system where state adjudications of federal rights are now
reviewed under a less stringent standard than is applicable in federal
proceedings, it is appropriate to consider the implications of these changes
on the whole of constitutional criminal procedure. First, it should be
obvious from the analysis above that criminal procedure reforms, AEDPA
in particular, are patently unconstitutional if selective incorporation
continues to be regarded as the appropriate framework for discerning which
provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states and to what extent the
rights apply to the states.325 Perhaps, more than any of the other challenges
to AEDPA, the tension between Fourteenth Amendment incorporation and
§ 2254(d) presents a serious constitutional question that must be addressed
by the courts.
The purpose of this Article, however, is not exclusively to raise anew
the question of AEDPA's constitutionality. Instead, this piece is intended
to serve as a critical review of selective incorporation, and more
importantly, as vehicle for beginning what should be a long dialogue about
the continued relevance of selective incorporation as a first principle of
constitutional criminal procedure. Given the gusto with which the Court
has embraced, or even invented, modern limitations on the ability of
492-93. Or, as Professor Charles Black once commented, without a strict system uniformity
like that imposed by the doctrine of incorporation:
[W]e ought to stop saying, "One nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all," and speak
instead of, "One nation divisible and divided into fifty zones of political morality, with liberty
and justice in such kind and measure as these good things may from time to time be granted by
each of these fifty political subdivisions."
Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights in the States, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 17, 55 (1991).
325 Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (recognizing that "Congress
may not legislatively supersede [this Court's] decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution" (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997))). Under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is afforded the remedial power to enforce substantive
rights, but "[flew questions of constitutional law are as uncertain as the scope of
congressional power to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1 (2007). Additionally, there is nothing to
suggest that AEDPA was intended by Congress to be, or even could be, a remedial
protection of substantive constitutional rights. Id. at 1-3 (recognizing that Congress's
remedial actions must be congruent and proportional to the wrong being remedied, but
suggesting that § 5 powers might be greater when Congress is not subjecting the states to
private suits for damages).
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defendants to vindicate their constitutional rights, it is fair to say that
selective incorporation has fallen silently into disfavored status.
Accordingly, though selective incorporation has been the controlling
constitutional doctrine for nearly fiftyyears, it is time to consider the status
of criminal procedure in an un-incorporated, or post-incorporation, era.
326
In particular, the scholarship of Professor William Stuntz, and the body of
related commentary it has triggered, provides a potential framework for
assessing the implications of what, for purposes of this piece, I have called
un-incorporation.
A. THE GREATER THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS, THE SMALLER THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Through an inductive analysis of four illustrative examples of un-
incorporation, this Article suggests that something of lasting and
historically significant import is afoot in the field of procedural criminal
law. Notably, however, up to this point there has been virtually no
moralizing or general policy commentary on these changes; by and large,
the approach has been a purely positivistic or descriptive one. From the
perspective of traditional proponents of a robust network of protections for
the criminally accused, this rolling back of the Warren Court's procedural
revolution is nothing short of a tragedy-promising that more innocent
suspects will be convicted and more guilty criminals will be sentenced
following unconstitutional investigations and/or trials. And the parade of
horribles may be exactly on the mark. Certainly, the criminal justice
system as it has come to be known in the United States is shedding the once
sacrosanct skin of what the Court now views as superfluous procedural
rights.
But a discussion of procedural changes, particularly dramatic paradigm
altering shifts in the field of criminal law, would be incomplete if it did not
at least consider the matter from the perspective of Professor Stuntz. In
Stuntz's view, the Warren-era constitutionalizing of criminal procedure
rights, though well-intentioned, may have caused more harm than good to
326 The term "post-incorporation" has been used before; however, prior to the enactment
of AEDPA and other court-created and legislative limitations on the ability of prisoners to
vindicate constitutional rights, most such uses were probably premature. See, e.g., Ronald
K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of
State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 317-18 (1986)
("The ongoing civil liberties exchange between the federal and state high courts underscores
the importance of federalism as a means of securing rights even in a post-incorporation
world.").
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the justice system. 32 7 Accordingly, Stuntz urged commentators to begin a
dialogue about the "substantial unappreciated costs" of robust procedural
rights in the field of criminal law.328
This dialogue requires some familiarity with Stuntz's hypothesis as to
procedural rights. Stuntz asserts that more attention should be paid to the
consequences of criminal procedure. Specifically, he argues that
"[c]onstitutionalizing procedure, in a world where substantive law and
funding are the province of legislatures, may tend to encourage bad
substantive law and underfunding., 329  In Stuntz's view, strong
constitutionalized procedural rights, which create the illusion of
"technicalities" for the guilty, are "not wrong in principle, but.., at odds
with [the nature of] the system., 330  The argument is that "[i]n a
legislatively funded system with state-paid prosecutors and defense
attorneys, judge-made procedural rights are bound to have some perverse
effects."33' After all, "the criminal justice system is characterized by
extraordinary discretion-over the definition of crimes (legislatures can
criminalize as much as they wish), over enforcement (police and
prosecutors can arrest and charge whom they wish), and over funding
(legislatures can allocate resources as they wish)., 332 As an example of
unfavorable shifts in substantive criminal law that may flow from the
procedural rights, Stuntz points to the movement to criminalize "'reckless
sex,' defined as failure to use a condom in an initial sexual encounter.
333
The criminalization of "reckless sex" is described as "a winnable alternative
to acquaintance rape prosecutions . . . of upper-class defendants. 334
Apparently, frustrated that "well-off defendants" facing prosecutors with
tight budgets will oftentimes escape prosecution or conviction because of
procedural maneuvering-"think of Kobe Bryant [or] Michael Jackson"
one solution is to consistently broaden the criminal laws.335
327 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) ("Ever since the 1960s, the right has argued that
criminal procedure frees too many of the guilty. The better criticism may be that it helps to
imprison too many of the innocent.").
328 Id. at 6.
329 id.
330 Id. at 56, 75.
331 Id. at 5; see also William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REv. 780, 781 (2006) ("The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after
helped to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after." (citation omitted)).
332 Stuntz, supra note 327, at 5.
333 Stuntz, supra note 331, at 796.
334 id.
331 Id. at 797 (citation omitted).
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Although there can be little doubt that criminal procedure rights, as
developed through the Court's interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, reflect a profoundly important aspect of our justice system, at
least in Professor Stuntz's view, these rights come at substantial cost to
indigent defendants. Accordingly, the Court's recent disavowal of the
procedural hallmarks of the Warren Court with regards to state court
defendants suggests that Stuntz's work could be illuminating as to the long-
term effects of these procedural retrenchments.
B. THE INVERSE OF STUNTZ'S THEORY
Principles of logic dictate that the contrapositive (negation and
reversal) of a true statement is always true. Accordingly if it is true, as
Professor Stuntz asserts, that the broadening of criminal procedure rights
has caused the creation of bad substantive law and underfunding, then it
logically follows that well-funded defense systems and affirmatively good
substantive criminal law would result in the creation of less criminal
procedure rights by the courts.336  Unfortunately, unlike a contrapositive,
the inverse (the negation of both premises) of a true statement is not always
true, and it is the inverse of Stuntz's thesis that is most relevant to the
discussion at hand. That said, Stuntz has acknowledged that "other
[factual] scenarios" could "push[] prosecutors and courts in very different
directions, 337 and in the spirit of furthering the discussion regarding the
relationship between substantive rights and procedural vehicles for
recognizing those rights, it is worth considering whether a reduction in the
force of criminal procedure protections will spur the development of a more
favorable body of substantive criminal law.
Specifically, the inverse of Professor Stuntz's thesis might be stated as
follows: When the procedural rights of defendants are treated as less sacred
336 At bottom, this is what Professor Stuntz is urging, an abandonment of the
conventional preference for judicially mandated procedural protections over legislatively
driven procedural and substantive law. Stuntz, supra note 327, at 6 ("But constitutionalizing
some aspects of substantive criminal law and defense funding would not tend to encourage
bad procedure, or bad anything else."). The key is that legislators define what constitutes a
crime, they define what the sentence for the crime will be, and they set the budgets for the
public defenders, prosecutors, courts, and prisons. Stuntz, supra note 331, at 786.
Furthermore, "politicians respond to incentives, and constitutional [procedural] law creates
bad ones." Id. Moreover, Stuntz argues that it is much more politically feasible for
legislatures to craft broad procedural protections for defendants than it is for them to pass
reductions in criminal liability or sentencing. Id. at 796 (noting that there is a large political
constituency supporting procedural checks for the potentially innocent, and not much
political will in support of "contract[ing] criminal liability"); see also id. at 792-93 n.72
(arguing that if "Miranda's restrictions were relaxed, a great many [other
procedural] ... laws would be enacted").
337 Stuntz, supra note 327, at 5.
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and are not uniformly applied as a matter of constitutional law, the
substantive legal framework and the funding of the justice system should
improve. Two questions flow naturally from this thesis. First, and most
importantly, has the process of un-incorporation as described in this Article
renounced the constitutional grounding of procedural rules in a way that
might motivate legislatures to respond in kind with substantive reforms?
And second, is there convincing empirical support for the notion that
diminishing procedure will actually generate progressive reforms in the
justice system? As to the latter question, there is surely room for debate,
and more research and commentary is needed on this point, but there is at
least anecdotal support for the notion that legislatures will step in to provide
procedural safeguards for the accused when the courts have not "occupied
the relevant field" with mandatory constitutional rules.
338
Unfortunately, progressive legislative efforts in the field of criminal
law appear to require an affirmative trigger-an affirmative judicial
repudiation or rejection of a certain procedural right. The sort of sub
silentio, gradual undermining of the incorporated rights that has
characterized the Court's application of AEDPA and its announcing of
other limitations, such as in Stone v. Powell, would not constitute such a
trigger. In other words, the un-incorporation regime as currently being
carried out might have the uniquely and doubly deleterious effect of
repudiating the procedural criminal rules without spurring the concomitant
substantive criminal law. The reason for this is simple: the relative
unhinging of the federal criminal procedure protections at the hands of the
Court is not being done with adequate candor.
Most of the opinions denying state court prisoners federal relief
reiterate, reaffirm, and purport to uphold the constitutional rule in question.
Rather than striking down the right head-on, the Court perpetually presents
one structural reason after another as to why the claim happens not to be
338 Some of the examples cited by commentators like Stuntz include statutory protections
of privacy interests in things like bank records, library records, phone records, and video
rentals. Stuntz, supra note 331, at 797 ("In several of those areas, Congress acted shortly
after the Supreme Court expressly declined to protect the relevant activity through the Fourth
Amendment." (emphasis added)). It is the absence of mandatory constitutional regulation,
indeed the rejection of such procedures that prompts legislative action. Id. at 798-99 (citing
the legislative reversal of the Court's holding that victims of police brutality were not
entitled to injunctive relief against the police departments, and the broad legislative response
to the case-Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)-that effectively bars Fourth
Amendment claims in racial profiling cases); see also id. at 799-800 (suggesting that state
and federal legislation protecting and encouraging DNA-based innocence claims is a product
of the Court's reluctance to recognize freestanding innocence as a basis for habeas corpus
relief).
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cognizable "in this case. 339  Justice Kennedy frequently speaks for the
Court when he refuses to award a prisoner relief on the grounds that the
"procedural posture of this case" suggests that the Court ought not to reach
the constitutional question at issue.340 If the inverse of Stuntz's thesis is to
have any chance of being realized, that is, if the diminishing realm of
procedural rules is to result in the development of a more progressive
justice system, the Court's approach to un-incorporation will need to
change.
If the view that substantive progress may result from these procedural
retrenchments is to be viewed as anything other than hopeless optimism, the
Court must candidly announce the changing landscape of the criminal
justice field. The undoing of selective incorporation for all practical intents
and purposes must be announced. If state legislatures and courts are going
to be entrusted with developing unique substantive and procedural
protections for defendants, a federal catalyst is needed. In essence, the
triggering of the sort of ingenuity and political will necessary to develop a
more equitable justice system will require an express renunciation of
selective incorporation by the Court. Candor by federal courts as to
whether the key procedural protections of the federal system, the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, still apply with uniformity and full force
across each of the fifty states and the federal government is a precondition
to spurring states toward the development of more equitable systems.
If stare decisis or equitable considerations convince the Court that the
gloss of uniformity that is definitional to selective incorporation must
remain, then AEDPA and Stone v. Powell ought to be recognized as having
created unconstitutional disuniformity in the application of federal rights by
depriving prisoners of a meaningful federal forum (or remedy) for
constitutional criminal procedure rights. On the other hand, if uniformity in
the application of the Federal Bill is no longer the lodestar of constitutional
criminal procedure, then the federal courts should acknowledge the
diminished status of selective incorporation. Such an acknowledgment
would facilitate transparency regarding the limited scope of the federal
criminal procedure rights in state courts. Under the current system,
prisoners get the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, federal courts
339 Oftentimes, the Court will simply state that given the posture of the case before it, the
precise issue will have to be decided "another day." See, e.g., Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S.
Ct. 743, 747 (2008). Likewise, in Stone v. Powell, the Court purported to reaffirm the rule
announced in Mapp while simply limiting when such a claim may be raised. 428 U.S. 465
(1976). Of course, as noted earlier, the limitations announced in Stone have led state courts
to conclude that Mapp's exclusionary rule is no longer binding on state courts. Katkin,
supra note 179, at 421.
340 Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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announce that the Warren-era procedural rules are to be applied uniformly,
and thus prisoners are deprived of the potential benefits of state
experimentation that might be facilitated if the Court forthrightly
announced the diminishing relevance of the constitutional criminal
procedure rights. And on the other hand, the federal courts apply AEDPA
as well as court-created limitations on habeas relief, thereby effectively
subverting the Warren-era protections.
In sum, Professor Stuntz's research suggests a strong correlation
between heightened procedural protections and a diminished concern for
justice in substantive law. There is a sense that advocates for a more
equitable justice system rob Peter to pay Paul when they prefer judge-made
procedural rules over legislative reforms to the justice system. Presently,
however, federal courts are enforcing drastic limitations on the ability of
defendants to enforce the federal procedural rights, and yet the federal
courts are refusing to acknowledge that selective incorporation and the
procedural rules it imposes upon the states are of diminishing relevance. In
effect, this sub silentio infringement of the federal procedural rights creates
a scenario where the Court is robbing both Peter and Paul. There is no
express trigger for states to begin experimenting with new, more equitable
substantive or procedural frameworks, and the constitutional procedural
rules are of increasingly limited force in federal court.
Assuming Stuntz's substance/procedure correlation is malleable, then
just as an increase in procedure corresponds to a diminishing corpus of
substantive law, a decrease in the availability of procedural protections may
correspond with an improvement in the substantive law. A substantial body
of literature documents the demise of the Warren era's criminal procedure
revolution, and this Article in particular situates this question within the
domain of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. However,
significantly more scholarship is needed in order to fairly and adequately
address the long-term implications of the diminishing realm of federal
criminal procedure. And more important still, there is a need for federal
courts to begin a more honest discussion about the practical force and effect
of federal procedural rights following the structural limitations imposed on
state prisoners attempting to vindicate these rights in a post-Stone, post-
AEDPA world.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law and federalism that "[t]he
constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the
constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void., 341 Early in
341 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821).
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our nation's history, while adapting to the notion of a union of united-states,
various states had suggested that the "[c]ourts of the United
States... cannot be appellate Courts in relation to the State Courts, which
belong to a different sovereignty-and of course, their commands or
instructions impose no obligation., 342 But in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
Justice Story provided the lasting framework for questions of federal law.
He reasoned that because "state attachments, state prejudices, state
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice,"
federal review is the touchstone of uniformity and fairness in the
application of federal law.343 Accordingly, commentators have noted that,
as a matter of history, "no function of the [federal] Court has ranked higher
than the protection of federal rights from hostility or misunderstanding on
the part of state courts. 344 Chief Justice Roberts recently reiterated this
view when he cited the "uniformity" principle announced in Hunter's
Lessee as the bedrock and "fundamental principle of our Constitution.,
345
Likewise, a fear of state prejudices and a preference, rational or not,
for a detached federal forum serves as the justification for federal question
jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, and the recent class action fairness
legislation. In view of this broad recognition of the dangers inherent to
trusting the protection of federal rights exclusively to state courts, it is not
surprising that when the Supreme Court made the Bill of Rights applicable
to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, concerns about the need for
the unifying voice of federal oversight were of central import. To this end,
the express purpose of selective incorporation, as opposed to its predecessor
fundamental fairness, was to avoid "U]udicial self-restraint which defers too
much to the sovereign powers of the states and reserves judicial
intervention for only the most revolting cases." Relative uniformity as to
federal rights was achieved by holding that once a right was deemed
incorporated, "it applied identically in state and federal proceedings. 346
There has always been complexity in the field of constitutional
criminal law, but selective incorporation insured that the evolution of the
field was applied uniformly across the states-the job of defining the scope
of federal criminal rights was, in a sense, a non-delegable duty entrusted
only to those courts that were above the political fray and immune from the
342 Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 12 (1813).
343 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
344 Arthur D. Heilman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
403,428.
345 Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1053 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
346 Brennan, supra note 68, at 545.
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capriciousness of election cycles. The role of the Court in enforcing against
the states the criminal procedure guarantees found in the Bill of Rights was
recognized as maintaining a baseline of uniformity.
Over the past fifty years, since the doctrine of selective incorporation
was announced, limitations on federal habeas review and the Court's
willingness to permit variation as to substantive rights announced under the
Eighth Amendment have effectively rendered the promise of uniformity in
the enforcement of the Bill of Rights hollow. There is a crisis of chaos in
the Court's federalism jurisprudence. On the one hand, reforms such as
AEDPA dictate that the content of the criminal procedure rights will
oftentimes be subject to reasonable variation among the fifty states. In this
regard, the only thing that remains uniform about the application of the
incorporated rights to criminal procedure is that they need not and will not
be applied uniformly by the state courts. But on the other hand, the Court
continues to view federal courts as the critical guardian of the actual content
of the federal constitutional rights. As Chief Justice Roberts recently
expressed the role of the Court in the realm of constitutional criminal
procedure, "[O]ur role under the Constitution [is that of] the final arbiter of
federal law, both as to its meaning and its reach, and [we have] the
accompanying duty to ensure the uniformity of that federal law.,
347
But the Court cannot have it both ways. Either the Fourteenth
Amendment in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause mandates
uniformity of content and remedy, or it does not. In the habeas corpus
context alone-which serves as the sole federal vehicle for vindicating
some federal rights-the Court's willingness to condone substantially
incorrect interpretations of the Constitution, and to affirmatively prevent
correcting actions by federal courts, is illustrative of the tension between the
ideal of uniformity and the reality of constitutional disparity.348
It is simply no longer the case that the federal criminal procedure
rights apply with "the same breadth or scope" in each of the fifty states,
349
and there is a need for candor on the part of the Supreme Court as to this
matter. Congress cannot legislatively undo a constitutional doctrine such as
selective incorporation, but the Court's unwillingness to declare
unconstitutional AEDPA's scheme of deference to state court adjudications
of federal law might foreshadow systemic shifts in the Court's unsettled
federalism jurisprudence. If uniformity of federal law is no longer the rule
41 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1054.
348 In a recent admonition to a federal circuit court, the Supreme Court stressed that
habeas relief on the basis of a federal constitutional claim is not available unless the prisoner
meets a "substantially higher threshold" than incorrectness on the part of the state court.
Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007).
349 Brennan, supra note 68, at 549.
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of the day with regards to criminal procedure rights, then it is time for the
Court to expressly acknowledge this fact and let commentators and
practitioners take stock of the remaining pieces of the criminal procedure
revolution. Ultimately, some may conclude that under Professor Stuntz's
model for understanding the relationship between substantive and
procedural rights, the justice system will be rendered more equitable over
the long term by a reduction in the Warren Court's criminal procedure
protections. But the necessary first step is a dialogue about the status of
federal rights vis-A-vis the states, or more precisely, the constitutionality of
AEDPA as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment law.
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